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Foreword 
The Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences Editorial Staff is proud to 
present our Winter 2019 Issue. Each year, our Editorial Board seeks out 
articles covering important and contemporary topics within the health law 
community. This issue particularly furthers the Annals tradition of covering 
a broad range of current and intriguing topics within health law and policy. 
These selected pieces contribute to the continued recognition of Annals of 
Health Law and Life Sciences as one of the country’s preeminent health law 
and policy journals. 
The first article, authored by Sam Halabi, analyzes the impact of material 
transfer agreements on infectious disease research. Mr. Halabi discusses how 
important it is for researchers to have access to biological samples for 
infectious disease research and he further explains that the way to obtain 
these biological samples is through material transfer agreements. Halabi 
argues that these agreements are creating substantial barriers to the trade of 
biological samples and ultimately are posing threats to the development of 
diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines. After discussing these threats, Halabi 
offers solutions to address the negative consequences resulting from material 
transfer agreements. 
The second article, authored by Obiajulu Nnamuchi, compares Nigeria’s 
implementation of its social health insurance (SHI) system with that of other 
African countries. Dr. Nnamuchi posits that the SHI system is the best route 
to achieve universal health care. However, Nigeria’s system has struggled to 
achieve success. By comparing Nigeria to Ghana and Rwanda, Dr. Nnamuchi 
discusses why implementing the SHI system can lead to success for some 
countries and failure for others. This comparison demonstrates why some 
countries are successful and shows how other countries, such as Nigeria, can 
learn from those success stories. 
The final article, authored by Miles J. Zaremski, exposes how professional 
conduct programs’ self-policing efforts often result in the unauthorized 
disclosure of Protected Health Information (PHI), which violates the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule. Mr. Zaremski explains that professional conduct programs use 
a patient’s medical records to discipline the medical professional who 
provided an expert medical opinion in a medical malpractice claim. This use 
of the patient’s medical records has not been authorized by the patient, nor 
does it fall within an exception to the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Additionally, 
Mr. Zaremski analyzes Illinois privacy law, which is more strict than the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule. Finally, Mr. Zaremski offers solutions that could allow 
for the lawful use of a patient’s PHI in these specific hearings. 
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HIPAA’S Privacy Rule and State Privacy Laws: 
Roadblocks to Medical Organizations’ Self-Policing 
Expert Medical Testimony 
Miles J. Zaremski* 
Douglas M. Belofsky+ 
“And whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my profession, as well 
as outside my profession in my intercourse with men, if it be what should not 
be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things to be holy 
secrets.” – Hippocratic Oath 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Fifteen years ago, Russell M. Pelton published an article titled “Medical 
Societies’ Self-Policing of Unprofessional Expert Testimony.”1  Pelton 
addressed the “current medical malpractice maelstrom,” observing that “at 
least from the perspective of the medical profession, a crisis of unprecedented 
 
* Miles J. Zaremski, Zaremski Law Group, Highland Park, Illinois, has been a member of the 
Illinois Bar for 46 years, concentrating in healthcare law.  A graduate of Case Western 
Reserve Law School, he is an author and lecturer with a national and global presence, and 
has held various faculty (adjunct) positions, including at the law schools of the University of 
Chicago, Case Western Reserve, Stetson University, the Macquarie Law School in Sydney, 
Australia, and the Rosalind Franklin University of Medicine and Science (Chicago Medical 
School).  He is the longest serving chair of the ABA’s Standing Committee on Medical 
Professional Liability, and the first president of the American College of Legal Medicine not 
to hold both an MD and JD. He received his BS from the University of Illinois.  He was 
called upon to advise Members of Congress on federal healthcare legislation, including The 
Healthcare Quality Improvement Act and the Affordable Care Act. Before withdrawing, he 
served as lead counsel representing the respondent expert in the case of Barrash v. AANS in 
the Federal District Court. 
+ Douglas M. Belofsky, Law Offices of Douglas Belofsky, P.C., Northbrook, Illinois, has 
been a member of the Illinois Bar for 32 years, concentrating in commercial litigation and 
health care litigation. He is a 1983 graduate of the University of Chicago and a 1986 
graduate of Washington University in St. Louis School of Law. He is an arbitrator and 
mediator for the American Health Lawyers Association and is also an arbitrator for the 
American Arbitration Association. He served as counsel representing the respondent expert 
in the case of Barrash v. AANS in the Federal District Court and the subsequent appeal to the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
1.  See generally Russell M. Pelton, Medical Societies’ Self-Policing of Unprofessional 
Expert Testimony, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 549 (2004). 
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magnitude is upon us.”2  He posited that “[a]t least some percentage of the 
current medical malpractice crisis is a direct result of unprofessional, 
sometimes outrageous, ‘expert’ testimony offered by members of the medical 
profession and, just as importantly, the inability or refusal of responsible 
parties to seriously police that conduct.”3  Pelton advocated self-regulation 
by the medical profession, and cited as a benchmark the program that had 
been adopted by the American Association of Neurological Surgeons, Inc. 
(AANS).4  The AANS pioneered the establishment of rules for its members’ 
expert testimony as well as grievance procedures for alleged violations of 
those rules (Professional Conduct Programs).5 
The AANS was reacting to the medical malpractice “crisis” of the early 
1970s caused by spikes in insurance premiums for providers and the number 
of medical malpractice claims brought against them.6  Thereafter, the tort 
reform effort grew in various venues,7 including civil justice reforms seeking 
to reign in and oversee expert testimony, the sine qua non for success or 
failure in a medical malpractice lawsuit.8  Policing medical professionals’ 
 
2.  Id. at 549. 
3.  Id. at 549-50. 
4.  See Id. at 554 (stating that AANS’s program has been endorsed by the courts and the 
AMA and is the leading program in the country used to discipline member physicians). 
5.  AM. ASS’N NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, The AANS Professional Conduct Program 
(Feb. 2011), https://www.aans.org/-
/media/Images/AANS/Header/Govenance/AANS_Professional_Conduct_Program_Overvie
w_2-2011.ashx?la=en&hash=8E78BF0942FD23565E2683EE39B061B24773FD76 (stating 
that the AANS established its Professional Conduct Program in 1983 to provide a forum and 
due process procedures to evaluate complaints by one AANS member against another. The 
AANS Rules for Neurosurgical Medical/Legal Expert Opinion Services were adopted by the 
AANS in 2003); AM. ASS’N NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, Rules for Neurosurgical 
Medical/Legal Expert Opinion Services (Feb. 2011) https://www.aans.org/-
/media/Images/AANS/Header/Govenance/AANS_Neurosurgical_Medical-
Legal_Expert_Opinion_Services_3-22-
2006.ashx?la=en&hash=A537337F65481F7C62EC64287BB007C2162F8E80 [hereinafter 
AANS Rules for Expert Opinion] (outlining rules for providing expert testimony); AM. ASS’N 
NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, Procedural Guidelines of the Professional Conduct Committee 
of the American Association of Neurological Surgeons (Nov. 2014) https://www.aans.org/-
/media/Images/AANS/Header/Govenance/AANS_Professional_Conduct_Committee_Proce
dural_Guidelines_11-22-
2014.ashx?la=en&hash=E3580000B8329F06DB4B1EFDDD9CCFD34E161391 [hereinafter 
AANS Procedural Guidelines] (providing rules and procedures of professional conduct). 
6.  Mark A. Hofmann Movement Began With Med Mal Crisis in Early 1970s, BUS. INS. 
(Feb. 15, 2004, 12:00 AM), 
https:www.businessinsurance.com/article/20040215/ISSUE03/100014138/movement-began-
with-med-mal-crisis-in-early-1970s; Pelton, supra note 1, at 549 (arguing that physicians 
willing to swear under oath that an injury occurred contribute to more medical malpractice 
claims being filed)). 
7.  See Hofmann, supra note 6 (outlining the various events, government, and interest 
groups that contributed the evolution of tort reform). 
8.  See generally Bruce Patsner, The Physician as Expert Witness: Essential But Who 
Regulates?, HEALTH L. PERSPS. (2008) (stating that the judicial and legislative systems as 
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involvement in litigation by their own medical societies was one approach to 
do this.9 
The AANS describes why its Professional Conduct Program was 
established on its website: “. . . to provide a forum and due process 
procedures to evaluate complaints lodged by one AANS member against 
another and to make recommendations to the AANS Board of Directors for 
action (dismissal or sanctions) on such complaints.”10  The AANS’ rules for 
medical expert opinion services “. . . are intended to ensure a standard of 
quality and impartiality in expert testimony provided by neurosurgeons on 
either side of professional liability cases.”11 
Several other organizations, as referenced in the pages that follow, have 
adopted Professional Conduct Programs to address members that wish to 
offer expert opinion in adversarial proceedings, regardless of the venue.12  
The type of “policing” of expert medical testimony that Pelton advocated is 
reflected in the rules of these organizations, which establish standards for 
how their members should offer expert testimony.13  Additional rules have 
been adopted to provide for the investigation of a charge that a member’s 
expert testimony violated an organization’s standards and for hearings on 
those charges if necessary.14  Proceedings under these programs are typically 
initiated by a grievance filed by a defendant in a medical malpractice claim, 
whether victorious or not, who feels aggrieved by an opposing expert’s 
opinions on the medical care provided to the patient who asserted the 
malpractice claim.15  However, to evaluate the grievance, medical records 
 
well as medical professional organizations provide oversight of medical expert witness 
testimony). 
9.  See Id. (stating that over the past decade medical professional societies have become 
more involved in “policing expert witness testimony by their members); See Pelton, supra 
note 1, at 549-50 (stating that “[a]t least some percentage of the current medical malpractice 
crisis is a direct result of unprofessional, sometimes outrageous, ‘expert’ testimony offered 
by members of the medical profession and, just as importantly, the inability or refusal of 
responsible parties to seriously police that conduct.”). 
10.  AANS Bylaws, AM. ASS’N NEUROLOGICALSURGEONS, https://www.aans.org/About-
Us/Governance/Bylaws-Codes-and-Guidelines (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
11.  THE AANS PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT PROGRAM, supra note 5. 
12.  See sources cited infra note 54 (highlighting a number of organizations that have 
adopted Professional Conduct Programs).  
13.  See generally AANS Rules for Expert Opinion, supra note 5; see infra notes 39 and 
47 (articulating guidance for how an organization’s members should offer expert opinions).   
14.  See, e.g., AANS Procedural Guidelines, supra note 5, at 2-5 (adopting guidelines for 
when an expert’s testimony may need to be investigated). 
15.  See e.g., AAOS Board Considers Grievances filed under the Professional 
Compliance Program, AAOS, 
https://www.aaos.org/AAOSNow/2018/Mar/YourAAOS/youraaos06/?ssopc=1 (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2018) (discussing grievance against John S. Toohey, MD regarding “statements 
made. . . in his initial and second expert reports and deposition testimony as an expert in a 
medical liability lawsuit”). 
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and information relating to the patient must be presented by both the treating 
physician and the opposing expert.16  Much of that evidence would have been 
obtained in discovery but not entered into the public record for the underlying 
malpractice case, even if the case went to trial and both the treating physician 
and the expert testified.17  Typically, the patients whose treatment is at issue 
are not advised of a subsequent grievance filed by their treating physicians 
before a medical society, nor are they asked to authorize the submission of 
their medical records.18 
Even before Pelton raised his concerns about the medical malpractice 
“maelstrom,” the judiciary had taken steps to emphasize its gatekeeping 
function in the use of expert testimony.19  In the 1993 decision in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court noted that “under the 
[Federal Rules of Evidence,] the trial judge must ensure that any and all 
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”20  
Since the Daubert decision, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has been amended 
to ensure that an expert may only testify to his or her opinion when the 
opinion “is based on sufficient facts or data,” the opinion “is the product of 
reliable principles and methods” and “the expert has reliably applied the 
principles and methods to the facts of the case.”21 
Pelton recognized that the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),22 and what is commonly known 
as the HIPAA Privacy Rule,23 imposed limits on the medical evidence 
available to Professional Conduct Programs.24  But Pelton doubted that they 
would “compromise the effectiveness” of those Programs, claiming: 
Under the AANS’ program, testimony is never reviewed until the 
underlying litigation is completed, in order to obviate any charge of 
witness tampering. As a result, typically the challenged testimony and 
related medical evidence have already been made a matter of public record 
in the trial and are no longer confidential. In addition, in those instances 
 
16.  See AANS Procedural Guidelines, supra note 5, at 1; see PROF’L COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAM GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, infra note 52, at 7 (outlining what information is 
provided to Committee members when reviewing grievances).  
17.  See infra notes 62-86 and accompanying text. 
18.  But see infra note 69 (emphasizing that the patient whose medical records were 
used in Brandner did not authorize their submission and raised HIPAA privacy concerns). 
19.  Cynthia H. Cwik, Guarding the Gate: Expert Evidence Admissibility, 25 LITIG. 6, 6 
(1999) (discussing the importance of expert evidence and the unique challenges expert 
evidence presents to judges, juries, and litigators).   
20.  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). 
21.  FED. R. EVID. 702(b)–(d). 
22.  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
23.  45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2013). 
24.  Pelton, supra note 1, at 559.  
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where some evidence is not a matter of public record it is not difficult to 
have it depersonalized.25 
This article argues that the HIPAA Privacy Rule and state privacy laws do, 
however, impose substantial roadblocks to the work of Professional Conduct 
Programs, prohibiting them from examining most of the medical evidence 
underlying expert medical testimony in most cases.  The HIPAA Privacy 
Rule established a foundation of federal protection for protected health 
information (PHI), balancing the need to protect such information with the 
need to avoid unnecessary barriers in delivering quality health care by 
providing exceptions to protecting such PHI.26  The Rule generally prohibits 
“covered entities,” defined as health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and 
healthcare providers, from disclosing a patient’s PHI.27  It allows the use and 
disclosure of PHI for certain health care operations, such as administrative, 
billing, legal and quality improvement activities.28  PHI may be disclosed to 
an insurance company or hospital in an invoice, or to a law firm representing 
the patient, or to a provider’s peer review committee for an investigation into 
care and treatment.29  States such as Illinois have imposed stricter privacy 
requirements upon providers than the HIPAA Privacy Rule.30  Patients can 
thus expect that providers will only use and disclose their health care 
information when necessary for treatment, payment, and, health care 
operations.31  They do not expect, nor does the HIPAA Privacy Rule or 
Illinois law permit, the disclosure of PHI to a private organization to evaluate 
the expert medical opinions offered in medical malpractice claims to which 
the patients were parties.32 
Despite the sanguine approach to patient privacy advocated by Pelton and 
codified in some Professional Conduct Programs’ rules, the identity of the 
patient behind a medical malpractice claim can usually be found through 
 
25.  Pelton, supra note 1, at 559. 
26.  When HIPAA covered entities can disclose protected health information to public 
health authorities, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY, 
https://www.phe.gov/about/OPP/dhsp/Pages/hipaa-policybrief.aspx (last reviewed by 
website publisher Apr. 21, 2016). 
27.  45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014); Beard v. City of Chicago, 299 F. Supp. 2d 872, 873 
(N.D. Ill. 2004). 
28.  45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2013); Beard, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 874. 
29.  45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2013). 
30.  See Medical Patient Rights Act, 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/3 (d) (2015) (establishing 
patients’ right to privacy and confidentiality of records, including restrictions on disclosures 
by physicians, health care providers, health services corporations and insurance companies). 
31.  45 C.F.R. § 164.506(b)(1) (2013) (stating that “a covered entity may obtain consent 
of the individual to use or disclose protected health information to carry out treatment, 
payment, or health care operations”). 
32.  Supra note 29 (listing permitted disclosures under the HIPAA Privacy Rule); supra 
note 30 (listing permitted disclosures under the Medical Patient Rights Act).  
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simple internet searches of the docket for the malpractice cases giving rise to 
these grievances.33 Additionally, many commercial entities maintain 
searchable databases of personal injury cases, which includes information 
such as the names of the parties, their attorneys and their experts, as well as 
summaries of the allegations, the injuries, and the resolutions.34  The ease 
with which the identity of the patient can be found makes it nearly impossible 
for a treating physician to comply with the “de-identification” requirement 
of the HIPAA Privacy Rule when PHI is submitted to a Professional Conduct 
Program.35  Physicians against whom a malpractice claim has been brought 
thus routinely breach the Rule and state privacy laws when they submit PHI 
in support of grievances they initiate against the experts who testified against 
them. 
Recent litigation over Professional Conduct Programs has confirmed that 
public policy favors the self-policing of expert testimony by medical 
societies.36  This is a Hobson’s choice between the ability of medical societies 
to self-police and a patent’s privacy under HIPAA. 
There are solutions for this dilemma, which include amending 
Professional Conduct Programs’ rules to require a patient’s written 
authorization before the submission of his or her PHI or amending the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule to exempt Professional Conduct Programs from its 
requirements.  This article will conclude that the best solution is to amend 
Professional Conduct Programs to require written authorizations from 
patients whose PHI will be examined due to the difficulty of amending the 
Rule and the varied requirements of state privacy laws, such as those in 
Illinois. 
This article will first provide a means to identifying the problem, its 
severity in general and its effect on patients.  It will also discuss the best 
method for practitioners and courts to address the “standoff” between public 
policy that favors private entities corralling inappropriate expert medical 
testimony and privacy laws that ensure the medical privacy of individuals as 
patients.  Additionally, this article will also address the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule’s pre-emptive effect on state privacy laws that may be more stringent 
 
33.  The plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit is generally the recipient of the medical 
treatment that gave rise to the claim and is thus listed as a party on the docket.  
34.  See, e.g., JURY VERDICT REPORTER, https://www.juryverdictreporters.com (last 
visited Nov. 15 2018) (allowing people to click on a link which lists the details of a personal 
injury case including party names and settlements/verdicts); See also VERDICTSEARCH, 
https://www.verdictsearch.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (allowing people to estimate 
damages, research expert witnesses and opposing counsel, project trial success, and analyze 
insurers’ settlement offers). 
35.  See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2013) (listing the requirements for de-
identification). 
36.  Austin v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(determining that self-regulation furthers, rather than impedes, the cause of justice). 
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than that Rule. 
Illinois is the Petri dish for analysis since the state is a bastion for the 
headquarters of notable medical specialty organizations such as the AANS, 
the American Association of Orthopaedic Surgeons (AAOS), and the 
American Medical Association (AMA).37  Moreover, because Illinois’ 
privacy law is stricter than the HIPAA Privacy Rule, courts may use its state 
law rather than the Rule in deciding whether there has been an unauthorized 
disclosure of PHI.38  Thus, Illinois law will be a focus to demonstrate how 
other states may wish to confront these privacy issues and their relationship 
to the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 
II. PHYSICIAN ORGANIZATIONS’ STANDARDS FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY 
The AMA’s code of ethics recites: “medical evidence is critical in a variety 
of legal and administrative proceedings.  As citizens and professionals with 
specialized knowledge and experience, physicians have an obligation to 
assist in the administration of justice.”39  The code of ethics requires 
physicians who testify as expert witnesses to “[e]valuate cases objectively 
and provide an independent opinion.”40 It provides that: “organized 
medicine, including state and specialty societies and medical licensing 
boards, has a responsibility to maintain high standards for medical witnesses 
by assessing claims of false or misleading testimony and issuing disciplinary 
sanctions as appropriate.”41 
The AANS’ “Rules for Neurosurgical Medical/Legal Expert Opinion 
Services” apply to its members that choose to offer opinions as an expert 
witness in legal or administrative proceedings, either by way of sworn 
statements, depositions, or during an adversarial proceeding like a trial.42  In 
 
37.  See Contact Us, AM. ASS’N OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, 
https://www.aans.org/Contact (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (indicating that the Executive 
Office of the Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons is located in Rolling Meadows, Ill.); See 
Contact the AAOS, AM. ASS’N OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, https://www.aaos.org/contactus/ 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (indicating that the AAOS headquarters is located in Rosemont, 
Ill.); See Contact Us, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/eform/submit/contact-us 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (indicating that the contact address for the Am. Med. Ass’n is in 
Chicago, Ill.).  
38. Supra note 35; See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/5 (2017) (showing that the Ill. 
statute has a broader definition of what constitutes protected personal information than 
HIPAA).  
39.  CODE OF MED. ETHICS, at 22 (AM. MED. ASS’N 2016).  
40.  Id. at 23. 
41.  Id. 
42.   AANS Rules for Expert Opinion, supra note 5; See also Standards of 
Professionalism: Orthopaedic Expert Opinion and Testimony AM. ACAD. ORTHOPAEDIC 
SURGEONS/AM. ASS’N ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS(2010), 
https://www.aaos.org/member/profcomp/ewtestimony_May_2010.pdf [hereinafter AAOS 
STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM] (describing how an orthopedic surgeon can provide an 
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the Rules, the AANS acknowledges that “[t]he American legal system often 
calls for expert medical testimony.43  Proper functioning of this system 
requires that when such testimony is needed, it be truly expert, impartial and 
available to all litigants.”44  The AANS’ rules for such testimony are 
organized under three headings: “Impartial Testimony”, “Subject Matter 
Knowledge” and “Compensation.”45  The rules relating to Impartial 
Testimony include the requirement that an expert “be an impartial educator 
for attorneys, jurors and the court on the subject of neurosurgical practice.”46 
The AAOS has adopted its own “Standards of Professionalism” for 
Orthopaedic Expert Opinion and Testimony.47  In those Standards, the AAOS 
recognizes that: 
It is in the public interest for orthopaedic testimony and medical opinions 
to be readily available, knowledgeable and objective. As a member of the 
orthopaedic profession, an orthopaedic surgeon must recognize a 
responsibility to provide testimony and expert medical opinions that are 
truthful, scientifically correct and appropriate for the context of the issues 
being considered.48 
The AAOS Standards apply to members “who provide expert opinions, 
testimony and other services. . . in the context of administrative, civil or 
criminal matters, [including]. . . writing expert opinions, signing certificates 
or affidavits of merit, reviewing medical records, and providing sworn 
testimony.”49  These Standards are drawn from the AAOS’ Code of Medical 
Ethics and Professionalism, which include the requirement that “[i]n 
providing opinions, the orthopaedic surgeon should ensure that the opinion 
provided is non-partisan, scientifically correct, and clinically accurate.”50  
They include a “Mandatory Standard” that an expert witness shall provide 
oral or written medical testimony or expert medical opinions in “a fair and 
impartial manner.”51 
Both the AANS and the AAOS have established grievance procedures 
through which one member can make a complaint against another for an 
alleged violation of their associations’ standards for expert testimony.52  A 
 
opinion as an expert witness).  
43. AANS Rules for Expert Opinion, supra note 5.  
44.  Id. 
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. 
47. See generally AAOS STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 42. 
48.  Id. 
49.  Id. 
50.  CODE OF MED. ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM FOR ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, (AM. 
ACAD. ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS/AM. ASS’N ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS 2011). 
51.   See AAOS STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 42. 
52.  See AANS Procedural Guidelines, supra note 5; see also PROF’L COMPLIANCE 
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member who is found to have violated those standards can be censured, 
suspended, or expelled from the organization.53  Other organizations, 
particularly those located in Illinois, have similar procedures.54  Typically, 
the complaint is heard by a designated committee, which makes 
recommendations to the organization’s board of directors.55  The 
organizations routinely receive and review medical records and information 
concerning the treatment of a patient by a member who is bringing charges 
against an expert that testified against said member.56  The accused member 
can appeal an adverse decision made by the board of directors to the 
membership at large.57 
III. THE SUBMISSION OF PHI TO PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT PROGRAMS 
A handful of physicians who have been sanctioned by Professional 
Conduct Programs for their expert testimony have attempted to challenge 
their sanctions, with a notable lack of success.58  Courts are deferential to the 
 
PROGRAM GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES (AM. ASS’N ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS 2018).  
53.  See AANS Procedural Guidelines, supra note 5; see also PROF’L COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAM GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, supra note 52. 
54.  See American College of Surgeons, Statement on the Physician Acting as an Expert 
Witness, 96 BULL. AM. C. SURGEONS 1, 1 (2011); see also CODE OF ETHICS OF THE AM. SOC’Y 
OF PLASTIC SURGEONS (AM. SOC’Y PLASTIC SURGEONS 2017) (relating to “Expert Testimony” 
and “Enforcement”); see also Roger C. Bone & Edward C. Rosenow, ACCP Guidelines for 
an Expert Witness, 98 CHEST 1006, 1006 (1990); see also GUIDELINES FOR EXPERT WITNESS 
QUALIFICATIONS AND TESTIMONY, (AM. SOC’Y ANESTHESIOLOGISTS 2013); see also AM. 
SOC’Y ANESTHESIOLOGISTS (ASA) EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY REVIEW PROGRAM 
COMPLAINT FORM (AM. SOC’Y ANESTHESIOLOGISTS 2012); see also Committee on Medical 
Liability, Guidelines for Expert Witness Testimony in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 109 
AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS 974, 977 (2002); see also Stephan R. Paul & Sandeep K. Narang, 
Expert Witness Participation in Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 139 AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS 
1, 1 (2017) (stating that “[t]he American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) first articulated a 
policy on appropriate medical expert testimony in 1989 [citation omitted] and was among 
the first medical specialty societies to do so.” Other revisions took place in 1994 according 
to expert witness guidelines from the Council of Medical Specialty Societies [citation 
omitted] and, thereafter, through 2016”); see also B. Sonny Bal, The Expert Witness in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 383, 385 
(2009) (showing that since 1983, it was reported that through 2007 “. . .at least 18 other 
societies had followed the lead of the AANS”) (citing to Andrew D. Feld & William D. 
Carey, Expert Witness Malfeasance: How Should Specialty Medical Societies Respond?, 100 
AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 991, 995 (2005); see also Aaron S. Kesselheim & David M. 
Studdert, Role of Professional Organizations in Regulating Physician Expert Witness 
Testimony, 298 JAMA 2907, 2909 (2007)). 
55.  See AANS Procedural Guidelines, supra note 5; see also PROF’L COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAM GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, supra note 52. 
56.  See AANS Procedural Guidelines, supra note 5; see also PROF’L COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAM GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, supra note 52. 
57.  See AANS Procedural Guidelines, supra note 5 at 6; see also PROF’L COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAM GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, supra note 52, at 20.  
58.  Barrash v. American Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, Inc., 812 F.3d 416 (5th Cir. 
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organizations’ attempts to police their members’ expert testimony.59  Judge 
Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in Austin v. American Association of 
Neurological Surgeons,60 stated: 
By becoming a member of the prestigious American Association of 
Neurological Surgeons, a fact he did not neglect to mention in his 
testimony in the malpractice suit against Ditmore, Austin boosted his 
credibility as an expert witness.  The Association had an interest—the 
community at large had an interest—in Austin’s not being able to use his 
membership to dazzle judges and juries and deflect the close and skeptical 
scrutiny that shoddy testimony deserves. It is no answer that judges can be 
trusted to keep out such testimony. Judges are not experts in any field 
except law. Much escapes us, especially in a highly technical field, such as 
neurosurgery. When a member of a prestigious professional association 
makes representations not on their face absurd, such as that a majority of 
neurosurgeons believe that a particular type of mishap is invariably the 
result of surgical negligence, the judge may have no basis for questioning 
the belief, even if the defendant’s expert testifies to the contrary.61 
An issue apparently not addressed by the courts or in legal literature, 
however, is the use of PHI by organizations such as the AANS when 
evaluating whether their members violated their standards for providing 
expert testimony.  Examining the judicial records developed in the handful 
of cases where experts attempted to challenge sanctions entered by 
Professional Conduct Programs shows that the submission of PHI is 
pervasive.  Those records are easily accessible using the Public Access to 
Court Electronic Records (PACER) system.  In each case, the parties’ efforts 
to de-identify the PHI submitted in support of a grievance fell short, leaving 
the PHI of a patient hiding in plain sight in the public record. 
The difficulty of de-identification can be seen in the opinion of the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Brandner v. American 
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, addressing an orthopaedic surgeon’s 
unsuccessful challenge to his suspension from the AAOS for violating its 
 
2016) (applying Tex. law); Brandner v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 760 F.3d 627, 
627-30 (7th Cir. 2014); Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 744 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2014) (applying Pa. 
law); Austin, supra note 36, 253 F.3d at 968 (applying Ill. law). 
59.  See Brandner, 760 F.3d at 628 (refusing to review the AAOS’ suspension of an 
orthopedic surgeon because it was “a private group, and Illinois . . . does not allow judicial 
review of a private group’s membership decisions unless membership is an ‘economic 
necessity’ or affects ‘important economic interests’”); see also Barrash, 812 F.3d at 416; 
Graboff, 744 F.3d at 128. 
60.  See Austin, supra note 36. 
61.  Id. at 972-73; See also Matthew Passen, Professional Self-Regulation or Witness 
Intimidation?, CHI. B. ASS’N REC. 50 (May 2008) (providing an overview of suits by 
physicians against peer review organizations for disciplinary actions associated with expert 
testimony).  
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standards for expert testimony.62  In that opinion, the patient, the plaintiff in 
the medical malpractice case giving rise to the expert’s suspension, was never 
identified.63 
However, the opinion did disclose certain medical information about the 
patient, along with information sufficient to locate the docket of the 
malpractice case and, hence, the name of the patient.  The opinion recited: 
“[i]n October 2004, Brandner was contacted to perform a records review and 
provide possible expert testimony in a medical malpractice case in Arizona.  
A minor patient was suing Dr. Kipling Sharpe for nerve damage that occurred 
during a surgery, a proximal tibial osteotomy, he performed on the patient’s 
leg.”64  An internet search reveals where in Arizona Dr. Sharpe practices 
medicine.65  An online docket search for the Arizona state court in Dr. 
Sharpe’s jurisdiction reveals the malpractice case and the name of the minor 
patient.66 
Indeed, the pleadings that Dr. Brandner filed in the District Court alleged 
that Dr. Sharpe had not complied with the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s patient de-
identification requirements in his grievance report to the AAOS.67  An 
affidavit submitted by the AAOS’ assistant general counsel addressed that 
deficiency, which was deemed rectified when Dr. Sharpe “resubmitted his 
grievance materials and de-identified the patient information.”68  Dr. Sharpe 
also submitted fourteen pages of his treatment notes for his patient to the 
 
62.   Brandner v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, No. 10 C 8161, 2012 WL 
4483820 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2012), aff’d, 760 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2014). 
63.  Id.  
64.  Id. at *2.  
65.  See Health: Dr. Kipling Sharpe, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 
https://health.usnews.com/doctors/kipling-sharpe-372416 (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) 
(demonstrating that the first result of a basic Google search yields that Dr. Kipling Sharpe 
practices in Gilbert, Ariz., in Maricopa County). 
66.  THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF ARIZONA, MARICOPA COUNTY: DOCKET CIVIL COURT 
CASES, http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CivilCourtCases/caseSearch.asp (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2018). The website for the Superior Court in Maricopa County allows 
anyone to search for a case in which Dr. Sharpe was a party. See 
www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CivilCourtCases/caseSearch.asp. The district 
court’s opinion in Brandner contains sufficient details of the proceedings in the malpractice 
case filed against Dr. Sharpe to confirm the identity of the plaintiffs. The opinion recites that 
Dr. Brandner was first consulted in October 2004, testified at his deposition on August 5, 
2004 and testified at trial on April 29, 2008. Brandner, 2012 WL 4483820 at *2-3. A search 
of the docket for the Superior Court in Maricopa County reveals seven cases filed against Dr. 
Sharpe. Two were filed in 2003, and one was filed in 2004. Of those three, only one went to 
trial in April 2008. 
67.  Complaint ¶ 52, Brandner, 2012 WL 4483820 (opinion granting summary 
judgment) (No. 1:10-cv-08161) (Document No. 6, filed Dec. 30, 2010 which can be found 
on PACER system for N.D. Ill.).  
68.  Affidavit of Melissa A. Young ¶ 29, Brandner, 2012 WL 4483820 (opinion granting 
summary judgment) (No. 1:10-cv-08161) [hereinafter Young Affidavit] (Document No. 74, 
filed Nov. 22, 2011) (document can be found on PACER system for N.D. Ill.).  
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AAOS, with only the patient’s name and date of birth redacted.69  Those notes 
detailed the patient’s medical complaints, the history of his leg injury, the 
results of examinations, tests and x-rays, Dr. Sharpe’s diagnoses and 
treatment plans and the patient’s post-surgical complications.70  Dr. Sharpe’s 
grievance report also contained a portion of the patient’s deposition 
transcript, which identified the jurisdiction in which the case had been filed, 
the names of all of the defendants, and the attorneys representing the 
parties.71  Even the record of the District Court’s proceedings on Dr. 
Brandner’s claims against the AAOS contains vast amounts of PHI, which 
was contained in the affidavit submitted by the AAOS assistant general 
counsel.72  The affidavit contained exhibits of Dr. Sharpe’s grievance report, 
excerpts from the deposition, and trial testimony of the parties and their 
medical experts, all of which detailed the medical condition and treatment of 
Dr. Sharpe’s easily-identified patient.73 
Moreover, the affidavit submitted by the AAOS’ assistant general counsel 
acknowledged that the attorney for Dr. Sharpe’s patient had raised HIPAA 
objections to the AAOS proceedings.74  Dr. Brandner complained that he had 
no access to the records he had reviewed in the malpractice case because “the 
patient’s attorney refused to produce the materials because of privacy 
concerns under HIPAA.”75  One of the documents that Dr. Brandner 
submitted to the AAOS recited that the patient’s attorney had sent Dr. Sharpe 
a letter notifying him that he was violating the plaintiff’s HIPAA rights and 
demanding the return of all of the patient’s records submitted to third 
parties.76  The record is unclear as to what, if anything, the AAOS or Dr. 
 
69.  Young Affidavit supra note 68, at Exhibit 7.  
70.  Id.  
71.  Young Affidavit, supra note 68, ¶ 33; See Young Affidavit at Exhibit 8, at 3, 
Brandner, 2012 WL 4483820 (opinion granting summary judgment) (No. 1:10-cv-08161) 
(Document No. 74-8) (detailing the names of the attorneys who represented the parties); 
Young Affidavit at Exhibit 6 (Document No. 74-6, filed Nov. 22, 2011) (all documents can 
be found on PACER system for N.D. Ill.). 
72.  Young Affidavit, supra note 68.  
73.  See Young Affidavit at Exhibit 6, supra note 68 (including Dr. Sharpe’s’ grievance 
report); Young Affidavit at Exhibit 7, supra note 68 (including Dr. Sharpe’s treatment 
notes); Young Affidavit, supra note 68, ¶ 33 (including excerpts of plaintiff’s deposition 
transcript); Young Affidavit at Exhibit 11, Brandner, 2012 WL 4483820 (opinion granting 
summary judgment) (No. 1:10-cv-08161) (Document No. 74-11, filed Nov. 22, 2011 
(including excerpts of Dr. Brandner’s deposition transcript); Young Affidavit at Exhibit 14 
(Document No. 74-14, filed Nov. 22, 2011 with excerpts of plaintiff’s trial testimony); 
Young Affidavit at Exhibit 26 (Document No. 74-26 with transcript of the hearing on Dr. 
Sharpe’s grievance before the AAOS Comm. on Professionalism) (all documents can be 
found on PACER system for N.D. Ill.). 
74.  Young Affidavit at ¶ 63.  
75.  Id.  
76.  Young Affidavit at Exhibit 22, at 3, Brandner, 2012 WL 4483820 (opinion granting 
summary judgment) (No. 1:10-cv-08161) (Document No. 74-22, filed Nov. 22, 2011 
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Sharpe did in response to those allegations of violations of the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule.77 
The record of the District Court proceedings in Barrash v. American 
Association of Neurological Surgeons, Inc. also demonstrates how pervasive 
the submission of PHI is, at least to the AANS’ Professional Conduct 
Program.78  In 2013, the Executive Director of the AANS submitted an 
affidavit in that case as part of the AANS’ efforts to resist the plaintiff’s 
attempts to review all of the grievance files from its Professional Conduct 
Program.79  The affidavit recited that a typical grievance file consisted of at 
least one thousand pages of documents, including medical records, 
deposition transcripts, and trial transcripts submitted by the parties.80  The 
brief submitted by the AANS in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion noted 
that, as of 2013, sixty-six grievances had been filed with its Professional 
 
(document can be found on PACER system for N.D. Ill.). 
77.  The Third Circuit’s opinion in Graboff v. Colleran Firm highlights the difficulty in 
protecting the identity of another patient whose treatment was at issue in a grievance 
proceeding. Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 744 F.3d 128 (3rd Cir. 2014). The case involved an 
AAOS member’s challenge to his two-year suspension from the organization after it found 
that he had violated its standards for expert testimony in a malpractice case filed against Dr. 
Menachem Meller. Id. at 131-32. The opinion did not name the patient, but recited: “In 2007, 
Dr. Graboff drafted an expert report that was used in Jones v. Meller, a malpractice case 
against Dr. Meller filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 
Pennsylvania.” Id. at 132. The patient’s full name can be found by searching for cases filed 
against Dr. Meller using the “Civil Docket Access link” at 
www.courts.phila.gov/publicaccess. Access to the Public Records of the First Judicial 
District of Pa., THE PHILA. COURTS: FIRST JUDICIAL DIST. OF PA., 
www.courts.phila.gov/publicaccess (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (“Civil Docket Access Link” 
is under “Requests for Case Records of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and 
Philadelphia Municipal Court”).  Even without knowing that the plaintiff’s name was Jones, 
the malpractice case at issue in Graboff can be ascertained from the list of twenty-nine cases 
filed against Dr. Meller by reference to the date of Dr. Graboff’s report. Moreover, the 
public record in the District Court proceedings in Graboff contains documents submitted by 
both parties that not only name Dr. Meller’s patient, but also disclose the patient’s PHI in a 
number of ways. Those documents include the initial grievance report filed by Dr. Meller to 
the AAOS Committee on Professionalism, a letter authored by Dr. Graboff relating to the 
patient’s malpractice claim, and the report of the AAOS Committee on Professionalism on 
the grievance, all of which contained extensive discussions of the patient’s medical history. 
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment at 
Exhibit B, at 8, Graboff, 744 F.2d 128 (No. 2:10-cv-01710) [hereinafter Memorandum] 
(Document 80-4, filed 2/24/12) (showing the grievance report filed by Dr. Meller); Id. at 
Exhibit C, at 20 (Document 80-4, filed 2/24/12) (showing the letter authored by Dr. 
Graboff); Id. at Exhibit N, at 15 (Document No. 80-7, filed 2/24/12) (all documents can be 
found on PACER system for E.D. Pa.).  
78.  Barrash v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-1054, 2014 WL 
5628807 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2014).  
79.  Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Response to Production 
Request at Appendix 3, Barrash, 2014 WL 5628807 (No. 4:13-cv-1054) (Document No. 38-
3, filed 10/15/13 (document can be found on PACER system for S.D. Tex.). 
80.  Id. ¶ 6. 
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Conduct Program alleging a violation of its Rules for Expert Opinion 
Services.81  That brief acknowledged that the AANS’s grievance files 
contained identifiable PHI, and claimed that the production of those files 
“implicates the privacy rights of patients under HIPAA.  Absent patient 
authorizations, the AANS would be forced to review medical records and 
transcripts from all 66 grievance files in order to locate and redact patient 
identifying information.”82 
The details of the AANS’ proceedings on the grievance filed against Dr. 
Barrash show how broadly the PHI submitted in those proceedings was 
disseminated to AANS members.  The AANS’ bylaws permitted Dr. Barrash 
to appeal the sanction entered against him to the entire voting membership of 
the organization.83  As part of that appeal, the AANS sent each voting 
member a statement by Dr. Barrash and a response in support of the sanction 
written by the president of the organization (See Appendix A).84  Both Dr. 
Barrash’s statement and the president’s response contained extensive 
discussion of the PHI of the patient in question, but the president’s statement 
noted the jurisdiction in which the treating physician had been sued for 
malpractice.85  With that information, any member of the AANS could 
determine the patient’s identity.86 
A. Severity of the PHI Breach 
PHI of any one patient is important because it is private and confidential 
to that person.  Accordingly, if PHI appears in a public domain stemming 
from any portion of a grievance proceeding that ultimately becomes public, 
that leads to that person’s identity to be in the public domain.  Thus, privacy 
boundaries have been crossed.  However, determining with any scientific 
 
81.  Def.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Compel at 3, Barrash v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological 
Surgeons, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-01054, 2014 WL 5628807 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2014) (decision on 
cross-motions for summary judgment) (Document No. 38, filed Dec. 15, 2013) (document 
can be found on PACER system for S.D. Tex.). 
82.  Id. at 8. 
83.  See Barrash, 812 F.3d at 418. 
84.  Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., Att. 23 at 16, Barrash, v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological 
Surgeons, Inc., No. 4:13-cv-01054, 2014 WL 5628807 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2014) (decision on 
cross-motions for summary judgment) (Document No. 78, filed Aug. 8, 2014 with the 
portion containing the president’s response to Dr. Barrash’s appeal included in this article as 
Appendix A) (document can be found on PACER system for S.D. Tex.). 
85.  Id. at 23. 
86.  The treating physician was identified only as Dr. Oishi, and the jurisdiction for the 
malpractice case filed against him was the “District Court of McLennan County, Texas.” 
That case can be found through a search begun at www.co.mclennan.tx.us/993/Case-Index-
Search. By simply entering “Oishi” in a search for civil cases, three results with dates of 
filing are returned. Knowing the relative dates of the litigation and searching for Dr. 
Barrash’s name in the docket for the three cases, the relevant case, and thus the name of the 
patient can be readily ascertained. 
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accuracy just how prevalent this type of disclosure is during any given time 
frame can be difficult.  Progressing through a step-by-step process elucidates 
why this problem has not been addressed.87 
To begin with, the volume and contents of grievances actually filed with 
these organizations is unknown.88  To obtain such data generally requires 
membership and a member’s password or a PIN.89  Next come the 
investigations arising from these grievances.90  Only a fraction of grievances 
filed may rise to this level.91  From there, investigations that result in hearings 
may become an even smaller population.92  Even fewer are those cases that 
result in sanctioned conduct levied against the offending physician-
respondent.93  Organizations typically make their membership and the public 
aware of those physicians so sanctioned, perhaps including the information 
in a membership publication or on the Internet.94  Lawsuits then challenging 
these sanctions are even a smaller lot, with published opinions yet an even 
smaller pile.95  Since violations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule are not 
determinative of an outcome decided by the organization’s grievance hearing 
committee, it would be an accident or merely fortuitous to uncover any 
mention of the Rule in a grievance, for example, as uncovered in the record 
in the Brandner case.96 
 
87.  KATHY BAKICH & KAYE PESTAINA, EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO HIPAA PRIVACY 
REQUIREMENTS ¶ 215 (Bus. & Legal Res. 2018) (giving an example of document with 
scientific data located on it but it was only used for the document and not the data in the 
proceeding). 
88.  Id. at ¶ 214. 
89.  Id. at ¶ 610 (explaining that online breaches of electronic PHI usually results from 
inadvertently enabling online access); see also Steve Emery et al., Compliance in Practice: 
Mitigating Risk in Clinics and Physician Practices, 81 J. AM. HEALTH INFO. MGMT. ASS’N 
28, 31 (2010). 
90.  BAKICH& PESTAINA, supra note 87, at ¶ 610 (describing OCR’s investigation 
process).  
91.  Id.  
92.  Id.; Tammy Worth, Lawsuits for Information Breaches May Be on the Rise, RENAL 
& UROLOGY NEWS (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.renalandurologynews.com/hipaa-
compliance/hipaa-noncompliance-information-breach-lawsuits-rising/article/706860/ 
(explaining that doctors traditionally did not have to deal with these types of lawsuits).  
93.  BAKICH  & PESTAINA, supra note 87, at ¶ 610; see Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, 
Competence, and the Principles of Medical Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 
298 (2010) (explaining that medical boards have been criticized for not imposing proper 
sanctions on physicians). 
94.  See generally RONALD L. KATZ, AM. SOC’Y OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS COMM. ON 
EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY REVIEW FINDINGS REGARDING EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY 
(reproduced in the Appendix of this article at Tab B).  
95.  FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., U.S. MED. REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS 22 
(2016) (depicting the number of doctor’s reciprocal actions to imposed sanctions is less than 
the number of imposed sanctions).  
96.  Brandner v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, No. 10 C 8161, 2012 WL 
4483820, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2012 Sept. 27, 2012), aff’d, F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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Because of this lack of transparency and the confidential nature of the 
proceedings, it is unknown (1) how many grievances are filed by medical 
malpractice defendants since the grievances themselves are confidential; and 
(2) among those private grievances, how many patients whose care and 
treatment formed the basis for a grievance are made aware of the filed 
grievance.97  Despite lacking any scientifically sound evidence to make these 
determinations, the Brandner and Barrash cases demonstrate this point, as if 
in microcosm to what other similarly situated organizations might have 
accumulated and disclosed in their publications.98 
Despite that portion of the Hippocratic oath quoted atop this article which 
requires physicians hold as “holy secrets” their patients’ PHI,99 the parties 
involved in a grievance — claimant, claimant’s lawyer, respondent, 
respondent’s lawyer, and the organization with its lawyer — probably give 
short shrift to whether or not an investigation and a hearing on a grievance 
violates the HIPAA Privacy Rule.  As seen in Brandner, many may not care 
or may find privacy breaches so unimportant as to never address them as a 
determinative issue for the grievance.  The physicians who administer 
Professional Conduct Programs that accept wrongfully-submitted PHI may 
never disclose a violation. 
However, as grievances certainly exist and will continue to be filed and 
administratively adjudicated, considering a privacy breach is much more than 
an academic exercise.100  Just because a privacy breach, generally speaking, 
is not on the radar of the participants in grievance proceedings does not mean 
it is less important and consequential than whether a doctor proffered proper 
expert testimony.  For instance, a privacy breach could be a possible defense 
by the accused expert physician, who could assert that the hearing cannot 
proceed because the HIPAA Privacy Rule has been breached absent prior 
patient authorization.101  But before landing on this strategy, it is necessary 
to define the parameters of the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s requirements. 
IV. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule prohibits “covered entities,” defined as health 
plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and healthcare providers, from disclosing 
PHI.102  Providers such as doctors, clinics, psychologists, dentists, 
 
97.  See BAKICH & PESTINA, supra note 87, at ¶ 214 (explaining grievance process).  
98.  Brandner v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 760 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2014); 
Barrash v. Am. Ass’n of Neurological Surgeons, Inc., 812 F.3d 416 (5th Cir. 2016). 
99.  See supra Part I. 
100.  See generally 45 C.F.R. § 160.306 (2006).  
101.  See Ousterhout v. Zukowski, No. 11 cv 9136, 2014 WL 804079, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 28, 2014) (showing that patient’s consent may be a defense in a privacy violation 
complaint).  
102.  Id.; Beard v. City of Chicago, 299 F. Supp. 2d 872, 873 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
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chiropractors, nursing homes and pharmacies are covered entities.103  Private 
organizations like the AANS or AAOS are not themselves subject to the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule because they are not covered entities.104 
Nor do those private organizations qualify as “business associates,” as that 
term is defined in the HIPAA Privacy Rule.105  Generally, business associates 
are persons or entities that are not employed by a covered entity but perform 
certain functions or activities that involve the use or disclosure of PHI.106  
Such functions or activities on behalf of a covered entity include claims 
processing, data analysis, utilization review, billing, or the provision of data 
storage or hosting services.107 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows covered providers and health plans to 
disclose PHI to their business associates if the providers or plans obtain 
satisfactory assurances that the business associates will use the information 
only for the purposes for which they are engaged by the covered entity and 
will safeguard the information from misuse.108  Covered entities may disclose 
PHI to a business associate only to assist the covered entity in carrying out 
its health care functions – not for the business associate’s independent use or 
purposes.109  Business associates may use or disclose PHI only as permitted 
or required by its business associate contract, and may not use or disclose it 
in a manner that would violate the HIPAA Privacy Rule if done by a covered 
entity.110  Business associate contracts must give a covered entity satisfactory 
assurances, in writing, that the business associate will appropriately 
safeguard the PHI.111 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule requires covered entities and their business 
 
103.  Are You A Covered Entity?, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Administrative-Simplification/HIPAA-
ACA/AreYouaCoveredEntity.html (last modified June 21, 2016).  
104.  See generally 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2013) (a healthcare provider is subject to the 
Privacy Rule if it furnishes, bills for, or is paid for healthcare in the normal course of 
business). 
105.  45 C.F.R. § 160.103.  
106.  Business Associates, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/business-associates/index.html (last 
revised Apr. 3, 2003). Changes made by the Health Information Technology for Economic 
and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) as part of Title XIII of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 included adding a category of business associates’ subcontractors, 
those that receive, maintain or transmit protected health information on behalf of business 
associates. All requirements and obligations that apply to business associates of a covered 
entity would also apply to downstream service 
providers.  https://www.mwe.com/en/thought-leadership/publications/2013/02/new-hipaa-
regulations-affect-business-associates.  
107.  Id.  
108.  Id.  
109.  Id.  
110.  45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(3) (2012). 
111.  Business Associates, supra note 106. 
166 Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences Vol. 28 
associates to protect the confidentiality of “individually identifiable health 
information,” which is defined as: 
information that is a subset of health information, including demographic 
information collected from an individual, and: 
(1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, 
or health care clearinghouse; and 
(2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or 
condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or 
the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an 
individual; and 
(i) That identifies the individual; or 
(ii) With respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe the 
information can be used to identify the individual.112 
In nearly all proceedings of Professional Conduct Programs, “there is a 
reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the 
individual” even if the individual’s name is redacted from all of the records 
submitted by the parties.113  Information submitted to support these 
grievances can be used to identify the patient, including information about 
the respondent’s expert testimony, the complaining physician’s care and 
treatment of the patient, where the care was provided and the venue where 
the underlying dispute was adjudicated.  Thus, even redacted submissions 
qualify as “individually identifiable health information” under the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule and its submission by covered entities to Professional Conduct 
Programs is prohibited. 114 
A. Authorized Disclosure of PHI 
Although the HIPAA Privacy Rule generally prohibits the disclosure of 
PHI, it does provide for exceptions.115  Certain of those exceptions permit a 
covered entity to obtain an authorization from the patient for the disclosure 
of his or her PHI or permit the entity to “de-identify” the patient by following 
specified requirements.116 
But since de-identification of the patient’s identity in a grievance 
proceeding is nearly impossible, obtaining an authorization from the patient 
 
112.  45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014). 
113.  Id.   
114.  Id. 
115.  45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2016). 
116.  45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2016).  
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may be the only way his or her PHI can be submitted to a Professional 
Conduct Program.  In any event, requiring an authorization should be the 
gold standard for every Program.117  A patient can, however, revoke an 
authorization at any time.118 
PHI may also be used or disclosed for a covered entity’s treatment, 
payment, and healthcare operations without written patient authorization.119  
“Healthcare operations” include conducting quality assessment and 
improvement activities, such as outcome evaluation, development of clinical 
guidelines and reviewing the competence or qualifications of health care 
professionals.120  A covered entity may also disclose PHI to another covered 
entity for its own healthcare operations, if each entity either has or had a 
relationship with the individual subject of the PHI.  The PHI must pertain to 
such relationship and the disclosure must be for the purpose of its own and/or 
healthcare providers’ treatment, payment, or healthcare operations or for 
health care fraud and abuse detection and compliance.121  Providers, who are 
typically the complainants in a grievance, cannot submit PHI to private 
organizations such as the AANS or AAOS under the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s 
provisions for healthcare operations because those organizations are not 
themselves covered entities and have no relationship with patients.122 
However, PHI may be disclosed without prior patient authorization in 
certain other circumstances.  Among them are disclosures for public health 
purposes; disclosures by a covered entity that reasonably believes that a 
patient is a victim of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence; and disclosures 
for health oversight activities (e.g., audits, investigations, inspections, 
licensure actions, disciplinary proceedings or actions).123  For all other 
instances, including discovery in a personal injury action in which the patient 
is a plaintiff, PHI can be disclosed only if (1) the patient signs a written 
authorization to release the PHI or (2) it is subject to a court order.124 
B. “De-Identification” of PHI 
In recognition of the potential utility of health information even when it is 
not individually identifiable, the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits a covered 
entity or its business associates to create information that is not individually 
 
117.  See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2016). 
118.  45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(5) (2016). 
119.  45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(1) (2013).  
120.  45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2013). 
121.  45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(4) (2013). 
122.  45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014). 
123.  45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)-(e) (2016). 
124.  See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2013); 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1) (2013); 45 
C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(i) (2016). 
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identifiable by following certain de-identification standards.125  These 
provisions allow the entity to use and disclose information that neither 
identifies nor provides a reasonable basis to identify an individual.126  
Professional Conduct Programs, either expressly in their rules or as part of 
their established practices, do require some form of de-identification of PHI 
that is submitted to them.127 
However, as shown above, the “de-identification” of PHI for use in 
Professional Conduct Programs is fraught with difficulties.128  The HIPAA 
Privacy Rule’s standard for de-identified health information requires that it 
“does not identify an individual and. . . there is no reasonable basis to believe 
that the information can be used to identify an individual.”129  The Rule also 
provides that: “disclosure of a code or other means of record identification 
designed to enable coded or otherwise de-identified information to be re-
identified constitutes disclosure of protected health information.”130  As 
grievance proceedings typically involve medical malpractice litigation that is 
a matter of public record, and, to reiterate from preceding pages, disclose the 
name of the malpractice defendant and the plaintiff’s medical expert, the 
name of the patient can be easily deduced from an online search of the docket 
for the court located in the defendant’s home jurisdiction or from information 
 
125.  45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2016); 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2016); see generally Guidance 
Regarding Methods for De-identification of Protected Health Information in Accordance 
with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (Nov. 26, 2012), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/De-
identification/hhs_deid_guidance.pdf (providing guidance and answering questions 
regarding the two methods that can be used to satisfy the Privacy Rule’s de-identification 
standard). 
126.  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 125, at 6.  
127.  Procedural Guidelines for Handling Ethics Complaints Against STS Members, 
SOC’Y THORACIC SURGEONS, https://www.sts.org/about-sts/policies/procedural-guidelines-
handling-ethics-complaints-against-sts-members (last amended June 7, 2017); AM. ASS’N 
ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, supra note 52, at 7; Professional Conduct Program, SOC’Y FOR 
VASCULAR SURGERY, https://vascular.org/about-svs/policies/professional-conduct-program 
(last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
128.  See generally Letter from William W. Stead, Chair of the Nat’l Comm. on Vital 
and Health Statistics, to Thomas E. Price, Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health and Human Services 
(Feb. 23, 2017) (available at https://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/2017-
Ltr-Privacy-DeIdentification-Feb-23-Final-w-sig.pdf) 
 (describing broad challenges with de-identification such as that de-identification is 
temporary and can still contain elements which can be used, directly or indirectly, to identify 
individuals, as well as weaknesses in the current approaches for de-identification); see also, 
Bonnie Kaplan, Selling Health Data: De-Identification, Privacy, and Speech 20 (Yale Inst. 
for Soc. and Policy Studies-Bioethics, Working Paper No. 14-024, 2014) (“De-identification 
is becoming increasingly untenable as a means of protecting privacy when supposedly 
anonymized data can be combined with other identifying data.”). 
129.  45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2016). 
130.  45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2016). 
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about malpractice cases and experts that are regularly posted online.131  Thus, 
no matter how well the PHI is de-identified, it can be easily re-identified.132  
Indeed, the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s standards for de-identification will not be 
met if the covered entity has “actual knowledge that the information could be 
used alone or in combination with other information to identify an individual 
who is a subject of the information.”133 
C. Professional Conduct Programs’ Attempts to Comply with the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule 
The AAOS attempts to address the HIPAA Privacy Rule in its grievance 
procedures, which require that: “all grievance material submitted must follow 
HIPAA guidelines for de-identifying patient information.”134  Consider as 
well the policies of three additional Illinois-based medical organizations, The 
Society of Thoracic Surgeons (STS), the Society for Vascular Surgery (SVS), 
and the North American Spine Society (NASS).  Paragraph 2 of the STS’s 
“Procedural Guidelines for Handling Ethics Complaints” states: 
Any physician or the Committee may initiate an ethics complaint. It is the 
complainant’s obligation to provide supporting records and other evidence. 
Any such materials must be de-identified and otherwise submitted in 
accordance with the applicable privacy regulations issued under the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.135 
The SVS’ Professional Conduct Program states: 
The Complainant shall de-identify all Protected Health Information, as that 
term is defined in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”), prior to submitting such information to the Committee.  
Protected Health Information that has not been de-identified will be 
returned to the Complainant in the absence of patient consent or an 
exception to HIPAA’s privacy regulations; however, documents or records 
which have been admitted into evidence in litigation or filed with any court 
are considered a matter of public record and need not be de-identified. . .In 
the event the Respondent submits Protected Health Information to the 
 
131.  See generally Brandner v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, No. 10 C 8161, 
2012 WL 4483820 at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2012), aff’d 760 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2014), 
Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 744 F.3d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 2014), and Barrash v. Am. Ass’n of 
Neurological Surgeons, Inc., No. 4:13-CV-1054, 2014 WL 5162898 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 
2014).  
132.  See Stead, supra note 128, at 8 (discussing ways PHI can be re-identified 
indirectly, through changing datasets, or due to inconsistent approaches to de-identification 
that provide inconsistent results). 
133.  45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2016). 
134.  AM. ASS’N ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, supra note 52, at 7. 
135.  SOC’Y THORACIC SURGEONS, supra note 127.  
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Committee, said information shall be de-identified by the Respondent. 
Protected Health Information that has not been de-identified will be 
returned to the Respondent in the absence of patient consent or an 
exception to HIPAA’s privacy regulations, or the litigation exception 
stated in the preceding paragraph.136 
Similarly, the NASS’ Professional Conduct Procedural Guidelines 
provides in pertinent part: Sec. A (2): “. . .the Complainant shall [sic] de 
identify all Protected Health Information, as that term is defined in the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (‘HIPAA’) prior to submitting 
such information to the Committee.”137  It then provides language similar to 
that provided by the SVS.138 
Few, if any, challenges to a party’s compliance with HIPAA’s de-
identification requirement are found in published legal opinions.  There is a 
practical problem why including a de-identification requirement in an 
organization’s expert witness rules is more a facially appealing requirement 
than an issue for a court or trier-of-fact to adjudicate; as in Brandner, the 
issue is one that has failed to require judicial scrutiny.139  On another level, 
as previously recognized, administrative hearings are generally 
confidential.140  The language of a published sanction can identify the patient 
on whose behalf the sanctioned provider testified in a medical malpractice 
lawsuit as well as some of the details of the medical care provided.141  Of 
course, the underlying litigation was already concluded and its record may 
not reveal such confidential information.142  The fact that the patient may 
never be aware of the use of his or her PHI in private reviews of the testimony 
of the expert hired in the patient’s medical malpractice case does not make 
the breach of his or her expectations of privacy any less egregious. 
 
136.  SOC’Y FOR VASCULAR SURGERY, supra note 127.   
137.  Professional Conduct Procedural Guidelines, N. AM. SPINE SOC’Y 1, 2 (2018), 
https://dnn.spine.org/Portals/0/Documents/WhoWeAre/PCECProceduralGuidelines.pdf?ver=
2017-09-11-143058-837. 
138.  Compare N. AM. SPINE SOC’Y, supra note 137 with SOC’Y FOR VASCULAR 
SURGERY, supra note 127 (indicating that PHI that has not been de-identified will be 
returned to the Complainant in the absence of patient consent or an exception to HIPAA’s 
privacy regulations).  
139.  See supra notes 67-68; see generally supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
140.  Compare Am. Soc’y of Anesthesiologists, ASA Member Sanctioned for Expert 
Witness Testimony, 76 ASA MONITOR 46, 46 (2012) 
http://monitor.pubs.asahq.org/article.aspx?articleid=2445922 with KATZ, supra note 94 
(demonstrating that both administrative hearings and published summaries of administrative 
hearings are kept confidential, detailing only the sanction imposed against the offending 
physician and the underlying bases for it).  
141.  See KATZ, supra note 94.  
142.  See KATZ, supra note 94.  
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D. Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of PHI 
The unauthorized disclosure of PHI by a covered entity in a grievance 
proceeding constitutes a “breach of unsecured protected health information” 
under the HIPAA Privacy Rule,143 and triggers a requirement of notifying the 
patient and reporting to HHS through its Office of Civil Rights (OCR).144  
The covered entity must notify each individual whose PHI has been 
“accessed, acquired, used, or disclosed” by the breach and include a 
description of what happened, the types of PHI involved, the steps 
individuals should take to protect themselves from potential harm resulting 
from the breach, and what the covered entity is doing to mitigate harm and 
to protect against any further breaches.145  If the breach of unsecured PHI 
affects fewer than 500 individuals, a covered entity must notify HHS of the 
breach through its web portal within sixty days of the end of the calendar year 
in which the breach was discovered.146 
OCR is responsible for enforcing the HIPAA Privacy Rule and 
investigating complaints filed.147 If it accepts a complaint for investigation, 
it will notify the person who filed the complaint and the covered entity named 
in it.148  The complainant and the covered entity are then asked to present 
information about the incident or problem described in the complaint.149  
 
143.  45 C.F.R. § 164.402 (2009).  
144.  45 C.F.R. § 164.404 (2009).  
145.  Id. 
146.  45 C.F.R. § 164.408 (2013); Submitting Notice of a Breach to the Secretary, U.S. 
DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/breach-
notification/breach-reporting/index.html (last reviewed Jan. 5, 2015). 
147.  How OCR Enforces the HIPAA Privacy & Security Rules, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-
enforcement/examples/how-ocr-enforces-the-hipaa-privacy-and-security-rules/index.html 
(last reviewed June 7, 2017); Enforcement Highlights, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-
enforcement/data/enforcement-highlights/index.html (last reviewed Aug. 17, 2018). The 
authors tendered a Freedom of Information Act request on July 23, 2018 to OCR, as clarified 
on October 5, 2018, requesting whether any HIPAA Privacy Act violations were filed 
against any of the following organizations since mandatory reporting was required in April 
2003: American College of Surgeons, American Society of Plastic Surgeons, American 
College of Chest Surgeons, American Society of Anesthesiologists, American Academy 
Pediatrics, American Association of Neurological Surgeons, American Academy of 
Orthopedic Surgeons, Society of Thoracic Surgeons, Society for Vascular Surgery, and 
North American Spine Society. The Office of the Secretary of HHS responded on October 
15, 2018, as supplemented on November 27, 2018.  There was only one filing involving any 
of these organizations, but was unrelated to a patient whose PHI was disclosed in a matter 
brought against a member of any of these organizations that rendered expert opinions.  As of 
July 31, 2018, “since the compliance date of the Privacy Rule in April 2003, OCR has 
received over 186,453 HIPAA complaints and has initiated over 905 compliance reviews.  
[They] have resolved ninety-six percent of these cases (178,834).”   
148.  How OCR Enforces the HIPAA Privacy & Security Rules, supra note 147. 
149.  How OCR Enforces the HIPAA Privacy & Security Rules, supra note 147. 
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Covered entities are required by law to cooperate with complaint 
investigations.150  If the evidence indicates that the covered entity did not 
comply, OCR will attempt to resolve the case with the covered entity by 
obtaining voluntary compliance, corrective action or a resolution 
agreement.151  A resolution agreement is a settlement agreement, signed by 
HHS and a covered entity or business associate, in which the covered entity 
or business associate agrees to perform certain obligations and make reports 
to HHS.152  The resolution agreement is generally for a period of three 
years.153  During the period, HHS monitors the covered entity’s compliance 
with its obligations.154  A resolution agreement may include the payment of 
a resolution amount.155  If HHS cannot reach a satisfactory resolution through 
the covered entity’s demonstrated compliance or corrective action through 
other informal means, including a resolution agreement, civil money 
penalties may be imposed for noncompliance.156 
OCR concludes most HIPAA Privacy Rule investigations using these 
types of resolutions.157  The HHS website warns that “if the covered entity 
does not take action to resolve the matter in a way that is satisfactory, OCR 
may decide to impose civil money penalties on the covered entity.”158  The 
HIPAA Privacy Rule, though, does not provide a private cause of action to 
individuals affected by a health care privacy breach.159 
In addition to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, organizations like the AANS and 
AAOS have their own ethical standards that require their members to 
maintain the confidentiality of patients’ medical information.160  In the 
 
150.  How OCR Enforces the HIPAA Privacy & Security Rules, supra note 147. 
151.  How OCR Enforces the HIPAA Privacy & Security Rules, supra note 147; Failure 
to Protect the Health Records of Millions of Persons Costs Entity Millions of Dollars, U.S. 
DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/12/28/failure-
to-protect-the-health-records-of-millions-of-persons-costs-entity-millions-of-
dollars.html?language=es (last revised Dec. 28, 2017).  
152.  Resolution Agreements and Civil Money Penalties, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-
enforcement/agreements/index.html?language=es (last reviewed Oct. 15, 2018). 
153.  Id. 
154.  Id. 
155.  Id. 
156.  Id. 
157.  How OCR Enforces the HIPAA Privacy & Security Rules, supra note 147; see also 
data referred to in note 147. 
158.  How OCR Enforces the HIPAA Privacy & Security Rules, supra note 147. 
159.  Doe v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 429 F.Supp.2d 930, 944 (N.D. Ill. 
2006). 
160.  AANS Code of Ethics, AM. ASS’N OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS § (D)(3) (Nov. 22, 
2014), https://www.aans.org/-
/media/Images/AANS/Header/Govenance/AANS_Code_of_Ethics_11-22-
2014.ashx?la=en&hash=124B159D6B41ACF78DFB0110EB55B10E68D5D3DD (requiring 
its members to “safeguard patient confidentiality and privacy within the constraints of the 
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AANS, a grievance alleging a violation of those ethical standards is subject 
to the same procedures and claims of violations of their standards for expert 
testimony.161 
V. ILLINOIS’ LAW IS MORE STRINGENT THAN THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 
Until now, the focus of this article has been on the HIPAA Privacy Rule.  
Equally concerning and problematic for any organization’s Professional 
Conduct Program is the interplay between federal and state privacy laws.  
Typically, federal law preempts state law if the two are concerning the same 
subject matter.162  HIPAA supersedes any contrary provisions of state law 
subject to certain exceptions, one of which allows state laws to prevail if they 
impose requirements more stringent than those of HIPAA.163  A state law is 
deemed more stringent when it affords patients more control over their 
medical records than federal law.164  Illinois’ law has been held to be more 
stringent,165 and Illinois courts have articulated a broad public policy 
protecting the confidentiality of the patient-physician relationship.166  This 
policy is based on Illinois’ Medical Privacy Law,167 as well as common 
law.168  Thus, as in Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc. and its progeny,169 physicians 
are required to maintain the confidentiality of their patients’ medical 
information even in personal injury litigation in which those patients have 
made their own medical condition an issue.170 
Illinois codified the physician-patient privilege in its Medical Privacy 
Law, which provides: “no physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose 
any information he or she may have acquired in attending any patient in a 
professional character, necessary to enable him or her professionally to serve 
 
law.”); Principles of Medical Ethics and Professionalism in Orthopaedic Surgery, AM. 
ACAD. OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS § V (May 2002), 
https://www.aaos.org/uploadedFiles/PreProduction/About/Opinion_Statements/ethics/Princi
ples.pdf (stating that “the orthopaedic surgeon should respect the rights of patients, of 
colleagues, and of other health professionals and must safeguard patient confidences within 
the constraints of the law.”). 
161.  AM. ASS’N OF NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, supra note 160. 
162.  Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977). 
163.  42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(2)(B) (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2018); Nw. Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 939 (7th Cir. 2004). 
164.  Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F.Supp.2d 705, 708-709 (D. Md. 2004). 
165.  Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, No. 04 C 55, 2004 WL 292079 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 
2004); Giangiulio v. Ingalls Mem’l Hosp., 365 Ill.App.3d 823, 841 (1st Dist. 2006). 
166.  Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 588-89 (1st Dist. 1986); see 
Roberson v. Liu, 198  Ill. App. 3d  332, 336 (5th Dist. 1990) (applying the holding in 
Petrillo to advance public policy of confidentiality in the doctor-patient relationship).  
167.  735 ILCS 5/8-802 (2015). 
168.  Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 588-89. 
169.  Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 588-89; Roberson, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 336. 
170.  Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 588-89; Roberson, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 336. 
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the patient.”171  This prohibition is subject to fourteen enumerated exceptions, 
including “in actions, civil or criminal, against the physician for 
malpractice.”172  Illinois courts have held that the Medical Privacy Law’s 
protections apply even if the patients’ names and identification numbers are 
redacted from their medical records.173  None of the fourteen enumerated 
exceptions to the Medical Privacy Law’s privacy protections would apply to 
a grievance brought before a professional organization by one physician 
against another.174 
The Illinois Supreme Court examined the scope and purpose of the 
physician-patient privilege in People ex rel. Dept. of Prof. Reg. v. Manos.175  
The Manos court held that a court could not compel the production of 
confidential medical records unless one of the statutory exceptions contained 
in the Medical Privacy Law applied: “[t]he legislature established a limited 
number of circumstances in which physicians and surgeons are allowed to 
produce confidential patient record information.  Courts must apply these 
existing exceptions and cannot create additional exceptions to the 
privilege.”176 
In Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., the Appellate Court recognized a 
broad public policy that bars any ex parte communications between an 
attorney for a defendant in a personal injury case and the plaintiff’s treating 
physician.177  The Petrillo court stated: “[b]ecause public policy strongly 
favors both the confidential and fiduciary nature of the physician-patient 
relationship, it is thus axiomatic that conduct which threatens the sanctity of 
that relationship runs afoul of public policy.”178 
Although the Petrillo court recognized that when a patient files suit, the 
patient implicitly consents to his or her physician releasing any of the medical 
information related to the mental or physical condition that the patient has 
placed at issue, it held that such consent was limited: 
The patient’s implicit consent, however, is obviously and necessarily 
limited; he consents only to the release of his medical information (relative 
to the lawsuit) pursuant to the methods of discovery authorized by Supreme 
Court Rule 201(a). A patient certainly does not, by simply filing suit, 
 
171.  735 ILCS 5/8-802 (2015). 
172.  735 ILCS 5/8-802(2) (2015). 
173.  See Parkson v. Cent. DuPage Hosp., 105 Ill. App. 3d 850, 855 (1st Dist. 1982) 
(deciding that removing patient names and identification numbers from documents is not 
compliant with Illinois’ Medical Privacy Law); see also Ekstrom v. Temple, 197 Ill. App. 3d 
120, 130 (2d Dist. 1990) (agreeing with the court in Parkson). 
174.  735 ILCS 5/8-802 (2015). 
175.  People ex rel. Dept. of Prof. Reg. v. Manos, 202 Ill. 2d 563, 578 (2002). 
176.  Id. at 576. 
177.  Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 588-89 (1st Dist. 1986). 
178.  Id. at 588. 
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consent to his physician discussing that patient’s medical confidences with 
third parties outside court authorized discovery methods, nor does he 
consent to his physician discussing the patient’s confidences in an ex parte 
conference with the patient’s legal adversary.179 
The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the ruling in Petrillo. 180 
In addition to the protections recognized by Petrillo, Illinois law may 
require even stronger privacy protections than the “de-identification” 
standard under the HIPAA Privacy Rule.181  In Parkson v. Cent. DuPage 
Hosp., the Appellate Court held that merely redacting patients’ names and 
identifying numbers was insufficient to protect patient confidentiality.182  The 
Court stated: “[t]he patients’ admit and discharge summaries arguably 
contain histories of the patients’ prior and present medical conditions, 
information that in the cumulative can make the possibility of recognition 
very high.”183  The Illinois Supreme Court echoed that reasoning in People 
ex rel. Dept. of Prof. Reg. v. Manos: “[e]ven if the names were redacted along 
with any other identifying information, the possibility of recognizing and 
equating a record to each patient would not be difficult.  Thus, it is reasonable 
to suggest that merely deleting the patient names and other identifying 
information from patient records would violate the physician-patient 
privilege.”184  This de-identification requirement may be even stricter than 
the one imposed by the HIPAA Privacy Rule.185 
The Illinois Medical Privacy Law does not expressly provide a private 
cause of action for its violation.186  Decisions from courts outside of Illinois, 
however, have recognized state-law claims for the unauthorized disclosure of 
private medical information.187  While it appears that no reported decision of 
 
179.  Id. at 591 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). 
180.  See Burger v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 198 Ill. 2d 21, 57 (2001) (quoting Best v. 
Taylor Mach. Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 458 (1997) (continuing to support the holding from 
Petrillo)). 
181.  See discussion infra note 185. 
182.  Parkson v. Cent. DuPage Hosp., 105 Ill. App. 3d 850, 855 (1st Dis. 1982). 
183.  Id.  
184.  People ex rel. Dept. of Prof. Reg. v. Manos, supra note 175. 
185.  Compare 45 C.F.R. §164.514 (2013) (stating health information that cannot 
reasonably identify an individual is not individually identifiable health information), with 
Parkson, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 855 (holding patient-physician privilege would have been 
violated had the names and identifying numbers of patients been excluded from a report), 
and Manos, 202 Ill. 2d at 563 (discussing that simply deleting names and identification 
numbers from patient records would violate physician-patient privilege). 
186.  See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-802 (2015) (explaining only exceptions to physician-
patient privilege, not creating a private cause of action). 
187.  See, e.g., Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 2015-Ohio-3268, ¶ 24 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2d Dist. 2015) (showing the independent Ohio tort “for the unauthorized, unprivileged 
disclosure to a third party of nonpublic medical information that a physician or hospital has 
learned within a physician-patient relationship”). 
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an Illinois court has addressed this precise issue, there are two bases that 
would suggest pleading a violation of this statute, even without an allegation 
of actual harm, would be sufficient to state a claim.  The first is 
the Petrillo line of cases, which suggests that a physician would violate his 
or her fiduciary duties to a patient by disclosing PHI to third parties.188  The 
second is recent decisional law interpreting Illinois’ Biometric Information 
Privacy Act (BIPA).189 
Last year, a California federal court held in In re Facebook Biometric 
Information Privacy Information that under the BIPA, a person need not 
suffer an actual injury beyond a violation of his or her right to privacy.190  
Illinois law is now in accord with the Supreme Court’s decision in Stacy 
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corporation.191  The Illinois’ high 
court held, “an individual need not allege some actual injury or adverse 
effect, beyond violation of his or her rights under [BIPA], in order to qualify 
as an ‘aggrieved’ person and be entitled to seek liquidated damages and 
injunctive relief pursuant to the Act.”192  This analysis follows the model 
established in the AIDS Confidentiality Act.193  The Court went on to say 
that a person becomes prejudiced or aggrieved, “in the legal sense, when a 
legal right is invaded by the act complained of or his pecuniary interest is 
directly affected by the decree or judgment.”194     
The analysis and holding in the Illinois Supreme Court’s Rosenbach 
decision suggests that a strong foundation now exists for a patient’s right to 
relief under the Illinois’ Medical Privacy statute when his or her PHI is 
disclosed in a medical organization’s administrative proceedings without his 
or her authorization.  If it is used as precedent, Illinois law appears to 
effectively strengthen a cause of action for breach of PHI privacy even if a 
patient does not, or cannot, plead actual harm. 
 
188.  See Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 595-96, 499 N.E.2d at 962 (explaining that 
“[c]ourts which have recognized the existence of a fiduciary relationship between a patient 
and his physician have consistently acknowledged that an ex parte conference is contrary to 
the fiducial obligations owed by a physician.”). 
189.  740 ILCS 14/ et seq. (2008). 
190.  In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 326 F.R.D. 535, 545-547 (N.D. Cal. 
2018). 
191.  Stacy Rosenbach ex rel. Alexander Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment 
Corporation et al., LLC, No. 123186, 2019 WL 323902 (Ill. Jan. 25, 2019).  
192.  Ex rel. Rosenbach, 2019 WL 323902 at ¶ 40. 
193.  410 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (2016); Id. at ¶ 26, 27. 
194.  Ex rel. Rosenbach, 2019 WL 323902 at ¶ 30 (citing to Glos v. People, 259 Ill. 332, 
340 (1913)) (emphasis added); see also Dixon v. Wash. and Jane Smith Cmty.-Beverly, 
2018 WL 2445292, *9 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018) (a complaint states a cause of action where 
biometric data was disclosed to an employer’s out-of-state, third-party clock vendor of an 
employer’s time clocks without informing the plaintiff or obtaining the plaintiff’s prior 
consent.). 
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A. Which Jurisdiction’s Law Applies? 
Although this article is focused on Illinois law, the law of other 
jurisdictions may be applicable to Professional Conduct Programs.  For 
instance, although the AANS and AAOS are both based in Illinois, their 
proceedings might be held in one or more other states.195  Moreover, the state 
in which those proceedings are held might not be the state where the 
treatment at issue took place.196  Illinois follows the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws (1971) in making choice-of-law decisions.197  While it 
appears that no reported Illinois decision has addressed which jurisdiction’s 
laws might apply to a patient’s privacy rights in his or her medical 
information, Illinois courts have applied Section 139 of the Restatement to 
choice of law questions involving evidentiary privileges.198  Section 139 
provides: 
(1) Evidence that is not privileged under the local law of the state which 
has the most significant relationship with the communication will be 
admitted, even though it would be privileged under the local law of the 
forum, unless the admission of such evidence would be contrary to the 
strong public policy of the forum. 
(2) Evidence that is privileged under the local law of the state which has 
the most significant relationship with the communication but which is not 
privileged under the local law of the forum will be admitted unless there is 
some special reason why the forum policy favoring admission should not 
be given effect.199 
The comments to Section 139 recite that the state with the most significant 
relationship with the communication is usually the state where the 
communication took place.200  Given Illinois’ strong public policy favoring 
the privacy of medical information, it seems likely that an Illinois court 
would apply Illinois law, even if the state where the physician-patient 
relationship took place had less stringent privacy requirements.  Since only 
 
195.  For instance, in Brandner, the medical treatment at issue took place in Arizona, as 
has been noted above in note 65. The AAOS’ grievance proceeding was conducted in 
Illinois, but Brandner’s appeal hearing was conducted in Louisiana. Young Affidavit at 
Exhibits 26 & 32, Brandner, 2012 WL 4483820 (opinion granting summary judgment) (No. 
1:10-cv-08161) (Document Nos. 74-26 & 74-32, filed Nov. 22, 2011) (documents can be 
found on PACER system for N.D. Ill.).  
196.  Id.  
197.  Morris B. Chapman & Assocs., Ltd. v. Kitzman, 193 Ill. 2d 560, 568 (2000). 
198.  Allianz Ins. Co. v. Guidant Corp., 373 Ill. App. 3d 652, 667 (2d Dist. 2007); 
Sterling Fin. Mgmt., L.P. v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., 336 Ill. App. 3d 442, 452-53 (1st Dist. 
2002). 
199.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
200.  Id. at cmt. e. 
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the patient would have standing to bring a breach of privacy claim, his or her 
choice of forum may also result in the application of the law of a different 
state.201  As there is no “one size fits all” solution to the privacy requirements 
of the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the laws of all fifty states, Professional 
Compliance Programs should require a patient to execute a release that 
complies with the state law of his or her residence before receiving his or her 
PHI regarding a grievance. 
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO OVERCOME THE PRIVACY ROADBLOCKS 
In Austin v. American Association of Neurological Surgeons, Judge Posner 
recognized the important public function served by an association’s policing 
of its members’ expert testimony, writing: 
We note finally that there is a strong national interest, which we doubt not 
that Illinois would embrace, in identifying and sanctioning poor-quality 
physicians and thereby improving the quality of health care. Although Dr. 
Austin did not treat the malpractice plaintiff for whom he testified, his 
testimony at her trial was a type of medical service and if the quality of his 
testimony reflected the quality of his medical judgment, he is probably a 
poor physician. His discipline by the Association therefore served an 
important public policy exemplified by the federal Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101 et seq., which encourages hospitals 
to conduct professional review of its staff members and report malpractice 
to a federal database.202 
Among the rationales for the Health Care Quality Improvement Act 
(HCQIA) that Judge Posner was confident that Illinois would embrace were 
the public interest in improving quality medical care by decreasing medical 
malpractice and providing a means of protecting effective peer review.203  As 
 
201.  Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 2015-Ohio-3268, 40 N.E.3d 661, at ¶ 24 
(Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2015). 
202.  Austin, supra note 36, 253 F.3d at 974. 
203.  45 C.F.R.§ 60.3, 60.12(a) (2013); RANDOLPH D. SMOAK JR., REPORT 18 OF THE 
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE AMERICA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,1-98,(AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 
& LAW), www.aapl.org/expert-witness-testimony (last visited Nov. 11, 2018) (showing that 
while it is unclear whether it ever was or remains the official position of the AMA, there is a 
report of the AMA Board of Trustees that is cited by others for the proposition that the AMA 
considers expert witness testimony to be the practice of medicine subject to peer review); 
Diaz v. Provena Hosp., 352 Ill. App. 3d. 1165, (App. 2d Dist. 2004) (pet. lv. app. den’d., 213 
Ill. 2d 556 (2005)) (holding that when a physician allows her medical staff privileges at a 
hospital to lapse when under a corrective proceeding for inappropriate medical care and 
treatment instituted by the hospital, i.e., the physician was “under investigation” by the 
hospital, an element under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act’s mandatory reporting 
requirements was triggered, thus mandating the hospital to file a report with the National 
Practitioner’s Data Bank (NPDB)).  Extrapolating from this analysis, and pursuant to 
definitions found in 45 C.F.R. § 60.3, if a professional organization sanctions one of its 
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previously noted, covered entities may not disclose PHI to organizations such 
as the AANS or AAOS under the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s provisions for 
healthcare operations.204  Thus, even if their Professional Conduct Programs 
qualified as peer-review programs under HCQIA as furthering quality health 
care, they would not be entitled to review any PHI for those purposes.205 
The standoff between protecting PHI under the HIPAA Privacy Rule and 
private medical organizations continuing to advance public policy by 
policing expert medical testimony thus remains a very real concern, despite 
there not being any objectively identifiable data to confirm its presence.206  
As long as there is expert testimony to substantiate or defend an adversarial 
proceeding, the risk of apparently inappropriate expert witness testimony that 
could result in the filing of grievances will always remain.  But by doing so, 
grievances continue to breach the HIPAA Privacy Rule by failing to de-
identify the patient whose care and treatment becomes the underpinning for 
 
members for rendering expert medical testimony not in conformance with the organization’s 
rules or regulations governing such testimony, its sanction may well be reportable to the 
NPDB if the organization is deemed to be a professional society “of health care practitioners 
that engages in professional review activity through a formal peer review process, for the 
purpose of furthering quality health care” and the sanction was entered “in the course of 
professional review activity” and was “[b]ased on the professional competence or 
professional conduct of an individual health care practitioner which affects or could affect 
adversely the health or welfare of a patient or patients”; see, e.g., Committee on Medical 
Liability, Guidelines for Expert Witness Testimony in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 109 
PEDIATRICS 974, 976 (2002) (highlighting “the important role of medical societies and 
licensing boards in maintaining the integrity of physicians who provide expert witness 
testimony”); compare Fullerton v. Florida Med. Ass’n, Inc., 938 So. 2d 587, 593 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1st  Dist. 2006) (“The narrow question we must address is whether HCQIA can be 
reasonably construed as authorizing peer review of a physician’s testimony given in a 
medical-malpractice action for the purpose of furthering the quality of health care. In our 
judgment, it cannot.”); declining to extend this holding, see In re Higby, 414 S.W. 3d 771, 
783 (Tex. App. 1st  Dist. 2013) (stating that providing expert opinion testimony and opinions 
implicates the competence of a physician, which falls within the purview of the American 
College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) Grievance Committee, which is styled after 
the HCQIA). 
204.  See 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014) (defining covered entities); see also 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.502(a) (2013) (HIPAA privacy rule); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(1)(ii) (Health 
care operations exception to Privacy Rule under HIPAA).  
205.  42 U.S.C.A. § 11112(a)(1) (1986); 45 C.F.R § 160.103 (2014); see also Brown v. 
Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1333 (10th Cir. 1996) (illustrating further 
that for HCQIA immunity to apply to a professional review body, the review action must be 
taken “in furtherance of quality health care”).   
206.  See Stead, supra note 128, at 2 (citing De-Identification and the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Hearing Before the NCVHS Subcomm. on 
Privacy, Confidentiality & Security of the Dep’t. of Health and Human Services, (2016) 
(statement of Daniel Barth-Jones), http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/transcripts-minutes/transcript-
of-the-may-24-2016-ncvhs-subcommittee-on-privacy-confidentiality-security-hearing/) 
(“Expert testimony at our hearing suggested that the goals of preserving the individual’s 
right to privacy while fully using digital information to improve health and outcomes may be 
on a ‘collision course’.”). 
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such a proceeding.  Again, the de-identification requirements of the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule remain instructive, as they set forth the standard for de-
identification of PHI.207  As noted earlier in this article, PHI is not 
individually identifiable if it does not disclose the identity of an individual 
and the covered entity has no reasonable basis to believe it can be used to 
identify that person.208  Clearly, the former is easily accomplished; it is the 
latter that remains problematic for any covered entity submitting a grievance.  
Equally problematic is the organization which seeks sufficient information to 
properly adjudicate a grievance, since it is likely that the parties will tender 
some form of PHI.  This will make it easy to identify the patient whose care 
and treatment became the subject of this expert’s testimony. 
Accordingly, the best and most pragmatic approach is for any such 
organization to amend the rules of its Professional Conduct Program.  
Specifically, organizations should amend their rules to require prior patient 
authorization that complies with the state law of the patient’s residence 
before any proceedings on a grievance filed by a physician can be initiated.  
Furthermore, the rules should be amended to only permit consideration of 
medical information that is part of the public record of a malpractice claim 
absent such an authorization.  The pitfalls are that patients are unlikely to 
give an authorization for a proceeding to which they are not a party and which 
was initiated by the very physician against whom the patient has just resolved 
a malpractice claim.  This requirement could well be the death knell of 
Professional Conduct Programs as they are currently constituted. 
A substitute for a patient authorization could be a court order permitting 
the parties to disclose the patient’s PHI.  The following is suggested as a 
revision to the procedural rules governing Professional Conduct Programs: 
This organization shall also accept a court order obtained at the expense of 
the Claimant, permitting this organization and members of its grievance 
and grievance appeals committees, and Respondent and its legal counsel 
where retained, to receive PHI from the Claimant as the covered entity and 
member of this organization filing a grievance, or from his or her business 
associate(s), arising from the legal or administrative proceeding from 
which expert witness medical testimony provided by the member of this 
organization was received or admitted into evidence or testimony.  Any 
such order shall provide for the disclosure, use, maintenance and 
disposition of the PHI or what would be considered PHI by this 
organization in compliance and in conformity with applicable federal laws 
and regulations. 
A second approach, although it may impose a requirement that may be 
 
207.  45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2013). 
208.  45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014) (emphasis added). 
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impossible to satisfy, would be to amend the rules for Professional Conduct 
Programs to require the parties to comply with HIPAA’s de-identification 
standard as expressed in this article.  The following language is offered as a 
template: 
No grievance and materials submitted with it shall be accepted for 
consideration without an affidavit under oath submitted by the Claimant 
attesting to compliance with the de-identification requirement mandated 
by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) so 
that any protected health information (PHI), as that term is defined in this 
act, will not disclose the identity of the patient.  This means that the name 
of the patient whose care and treatment was the subject of the Respondent-
member’s expert witness medical testimony is not identified and there does 
not exist a reasonable basis that the identity of the patient can be identified 
from such protected health information.  If the Claimant in good faith 
believes that a reasonable basis exists to identify the patient from the PHI, 
then the Claimant must provide as part of the grievance either (1) a signed 
and notarized authorization from the patient to allow the patient’s PHI to 
be used as part of the grievance and this organization’s use of it until its 
administrative proceedings are concluded, or (2) provide an attestation that 
any PHI submitted as part of the grievance and the organization’s 
consideration of it arises from documentation already of public record, 
such as made part of an underlying administrative or legal proceeding. 
While the above options are self-regulating because they ask each private 
organization to amend or add to their rules, problems are inherent in doing 
so.  Some organizations reference HIPAA, some reference de-identification, 
and no doubt others never mention privacy.209  There is no uniformity.  Then 
again, different documents can be disseminated to the membership, published 
on the organizations’ websites, or included in the public record in a lawsuit’s 
published pleadings (see Appendix A and B).210  As demonstrated, a private 
organization, its grievance committees, or anyone with a computer can re-
identify the patient’s identity with considerable ease.211 
A final option, though the least likely due to its difficulty, is to amend the 
provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) relating to “covered 
entities,” “business associates” or “health care operations,” to provide 
uniformity among all medical organizations whose rules address expert 
 
209.  AM. ASS’N OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, supra note 52, at 7; AANS Procedural 
Guidelines, supra note 5; SOC’Y FOR VASCULAR SURGERY, supra note 127.  
210.  See generally supra, Section III. THE SUBMISSION OF PHI TO PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT PROGRAMS. 
211.  CHRIS CULNANE ET AL., HEALTH DATA IN AN OPEN WORLD: A REPORT ON RE-
IDENTIFYING PATIENTS IN THE MBS/PBS DATASET AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RELEASES OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DATA 1 (Univ. of Melborne, 2017), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.05627.pdf. 
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medical witness opinion and testimony.212  This is particularly warranted 
given that the present regulations exempt certain groups of physicians, 
including those involved in ensuring quality assurance, peer review, patient 
safety, and public health and safety.213  This leaves out those physicians 
constituting one or more committees that are selected by their respective 
organizations to investigate and hear grievances filed against organization 
members that have provided opinion or testimony, or both, as expert medical 
witnesses.214 
Thus, this article proffers the following, in the alternative or in conjunction 
with one or more of the suggested amendments to the C.F.R., to be considered 
by Congress, HHS, and lobbyists speaking for medical specialty 
organizations. 
Adding to the definition of “business associate” in 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 is 
one approach to consider.  A new subparagraph (iii) to paragraph (1) could 
be inserted to include a person who, with respect to a covered entity: 
Receives a grievance from the covered entity arising out of expert medical 
witness opinion or testimony given by a third party and who provides rules 
or procedures that govern the filing of any such grievance. Also included 
would be the Respondent to the grievance. 
A new subparagraph (iv) could be added to paragraph (3) of the definition 
to expressly include as a business associate: “A medical specialty 
organization or similarly situated entity that governs its membership relating 
to the offering of expert medical witness opinion or testimony.  Also included 
would be the person that is the subject of the grievance.” 
Alternatively, the definition of “covered entity” in 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 
could be amended to add a new subparagraph (4) to enlarge the definition of 
the term to include: “A medical specialty organization or other entity that 
governs its members providing expert medical witness opinion or testimony, 
including parties involved in any grievance challenging the testimony of that 
member.” 
Another approach would be to amend 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 to add 
subparagraph (6)(vi) to the definition of “health care operations” to include 
the following as a business management and general administrative activity 
of a covered entity: “[a] medical specialty organization or similarly 
established entity that has provisions as part of its rules those that govern 
expert medical witness opinion or testimony provided by any of its 
members.” 
Absent patient consent for the use of PHI in a grievance or in a public 
 
212.  See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2014). 
213.  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2013); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2014). 
214.  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2013); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2014). 
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record, these proposed amendments would provide that when a grievance is 
filed by a member of the organization, the organization and the respondent 
automatically become covered entities, or business associates, of the 
aggrieved health care provider filing the grievance.  By expanding the 
definition of covered entity, the expansion of “health care operations” would 
allow the organization and its grievance committees, together with the 
participants, to be exempted from the de-identification requirement arising 
from unlawful use of PHI. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As the claimant is likely the only covered entity involved in a grievance 
proceeding involving a physician’s expert testimony, the burdens of the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule fall more heavily on him or her, particularly if they 
wish to submit PHI to a Professional Conduct Program.  This article first 
posits a “best measure to undertake” to overcome the roadblocks imposed by 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule and state privacy laws when an organization seeks 
to examine the expert medical witness testimony offered by one of its 
members.  The gold standard for any Professional Conduct Program should 
be the amendment of its rules to require an authorization from the subject 
patient for the release of his or her PHI before any proceedings can be 
initiated on a grievance filed by a physician.  Absent such an authorization, 
the rules should only permit the consideration of medical information that is 
part of the public record of a malpractice claim. 
To reiterate, when an unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical 
information occurs in a grievance proceeding, the only available remedies 
may be for the patient to bring an action against the treating physician for 
injunctive relief or damages under state law, file a complaint with the OCR 
or for a member of the organization to bring a grievance of their own for 
violation of the organization’s confidentiality rules.  Equally true, the 
organization should be mindful of the role that it plays in encouraging the 
violation of patient confidentiality in the name of regulating expert 
testimony. 
Both the organization and the parties to a grievance must recognize that 
complacency as a substitute for ensuring the privacy of patients’ PHI is not 
acceptable.  Organizations’ rules requiring the parties to merely eliminate a 
patient’s name or other explicitly identifiable markers that will identify the 
patient is woefully insufficient if not unlawful given the ease with which 
information about the underlying medical malpractice litigation can be found.  
It would be incredulous if such an attitude reflected in these entities’ 
administrative rules continued to exist given the contents of this writing.  The 
goal must be to find a proper balance between allowing healthcare 
organizations to police their members who testify as medical experts – 
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principally in medical malpractice cases – and requiring full compliance with 
state and federal law. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Response of the AANS Board of Directors to the Appeal by J. Martin 
Barrash, M.D. 
B. American Society of Anesthesiologists Committee on Expert Witness 
Testimony Review Findings Regarding Expert Witness Testimony by 
Ronald L. Katz, M.D. 
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RESPONSE OF THE AANS BOARD OF DIRECTORS
TO THE APPEAL BYJ MARTIN BARRASH. M.D.
The MNS Board of Directors voted to censure Dr. Barrash
because in his testimony in the underlying lawsuit he: (1) Failed to-
review a 1'1 of the relevant and available medlcal.rnaterlal (specifically
the diagnostic imaging studies) prior to. testifying; and (2) Failed at
. times to provide unbiased testimony. The fact that the Professional
Conduct Committee and Board of Directors agreed with some of Dr.
Barrash's criticisms of the treating physician's delayed diagnosis' and
..
treatment of the patient does not excuse or make acceptable his
otherwise unprofessional testimony.
CLINICAL BACKGROUND
The patient was a forty year old man when he underwent a two level'
instrumented posterior lumbar lnterbody fusion by Dr. Oishi on
February 2, 2004. His pre-operative symptoms stemmed' from an
industrial accident approximately four' weeks previously. He was
seen in December 2003, and was found to be neurologically intact.
Imaging demonstrated two level degenerative disc disease at L4-5
and L5-S1 with moderate stenosis. No motion films were obtained:
Immediately post-operatively, he awakened With severe left leg pain
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TAB A
which had not been noted before the operation, as the major pre-operative
, complaint had been 'low back pain. No further imaging was obtained during the
initial hospitalization. Perioperative antibiotics were administrated and he was
discharged on February 6, with analgesics for his back and leg pain and a seven
day course of Keflex.
The patient's wife noted some oozing from the wound, and he was seen
by Dr. Oishi's physician assistant on February 12. A small amount of drainage
and swelling were noted ana the staples were removed. There was no evidence
of infection according to Dr. Oishi. On February 20" the patient was seen by a
physician assistant from Dr. Oishi's office as Dr. Oishi was unavailable. Some
drainage was noted.,
Because the left leg pain had continued and was severe, a second
operation was performed on March 7, at which 'time a portion of the L5-S1
interbody graft was drilled away to relieve possible nerve root pressure, and the
fixation system was modified. This second operation relieved the leg pain. No
infection wa~ evident at the second operation according to Dr. Oishi.
On March 24, the staples were removed by a physician assistant and a
small "scab" was noted. On March 3D, the patient developed fever ranging from
102 to .103 degrees. On April 3, his wife noted intermittent but copious drainage
of greenish purulent material. He was seen in the office and the wound was
found to be slightly erythematous and swollen, but not draining at the time. No. .
cultures were taken nor were an ESR nor CRP obtained, but a WBC was normal.
He was given Cipro. the wound' continued to drain according to his wife. On
April 14, he .saw Dr. Oishi with a severe cough. Achest CT was ordered and
obtained on April 16. The report of this' study indicated a perihepatic cystic
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lesion. About ten days later, on April 27, Dr. Oishi called the patient and. advised
him to contact his primary physician, Dr. Trippe. Because of severe pain and
fever, arid the radiographic findings, Dr. Trippe prescribed Timentin and admitted
him to the hospital on May 11. Infectious disease consultation was obtained and
he was switched to Zosyn. The perihepatic cystic lesion was aspirated and
confirmed the diagnosis of an abscess. Cultures grew out staphylococcus
aureus. A third operation was carried out on May 13, to remove the hardware
and debride the wound.
After a prolong'ed hospitalization and successful treatment of his infection,
-:.... .
he recovered, but was left with chronic pain, instability, and depression. He was
unable to work and required treatment by a pain management specialist.
",
•
Ultimately, a fourth operation was done for stabilization on January 13, 2006:
The outcome of this procedure was not made available to the PCC.
The patient and his wife contacted an attorney who in turn retained Dr.
Barrash and filed suit against Dr. Oishi in the District Court of McLennan County,
Texas'. Dr. Barrash's deposition was taken. The lawsuit was settled out of court
and did not proceed to trial. pro Oishi then filed a complaint against Dr. Barrash
with the AANS' Professional Conduct Committee,which concluded that a hearing
was warranted.
DR. BARRASH'S TESTIMONY
'The primary issues which Dr. Barrash felt supported a negligence lawsuit
against Dr. Oishi included: 1) Failure to aggressively pursue,' identity, and treat
the cause of the patienfs postoperative left leg pain which Dr, Barrash attributed
most likely to the iriterbody graft having been incorrectly positioned at surgery;
2) failure to promptly recognize and adequately pursue, identify, and treat a
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probable serious post-operative infection; 3) failure to obtain prompt consultation;
4) failure to manage perioperative antibiotic therapy correctly; 5) delegation of
care to assistants when such care would more appropriately have been rendered
by the surgeon; arid 6) that these failures caused the need for a delayed fusion
surgery, a chronic pain syndrome, depression, and inability to work.
During his deposition, in addltion to his criticisms of Dr Oishi's failure to
timely identify and treat the infection, criticisms with which the rcc is in
agreement, Dr, Barrash's testimony also included statements' that Dr.. Oishi
probably incorrectly positioned an interbody graft at the first surgery. However, Dr
. Barrash never reviewed any of the' imaging studies prior to. making this
statement. In addition, Dr. Barrash last operated as a primary surgeon in 1999 or
2000. Dr Barrash stated that posterior hardware will prevent graft retropulsion,
and that Dr. Oishi's surgery which took four hours should only have required 2 -
2.1/2 hours and that the four hour surgery indicates inexperience ..
DR. OISHI'S CHARGES
Dr. Oishi's complaints from his letters of November 10, 2008 and
November: 24, 2008 include:
A. Failure by Dr. Barrash to provide impartial testimony;
B. Failure by Dr. Barrash to review all pertinent available medical
information;
C. Failure by Dr. Barrash to allow for differing medical opinions; and
D. That Dr. Barrash did not have sufficient training and recent surgical
experience to be competent to.testify in this case.
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BRIEF HEARING SUMMARY .
The hearing took place in New Orleans on Sunday Oct 25 2009. Present
,were Dr. Oishi, Dr. Barrash and his attorney Dr. Clark Watts, PCC members Ben
Blackett chairman, Dr. Volker Sonntag, Dr. Clarence Watridge, Dr. Roberto
Heros, Dr. Stephen Giannotta, and Dr. Hal Hankinson.
Dr. Oishi made an abbreviated presentation without reviewing orally his
prior written submissions. He presented the intraoperative X-ray showing the
intervertebral grafts and.the posterior instrumentation including the pedicle
screws.
Dr. Barrash addressed the claim that he was not competent to testify on
this case saying that althouqh he had not bperated as primary surgeon since
1999, he did assist on about 50 spine surgeries per year. He answered the
charge that he was not-spine fellowship trained saying that he had helped train
some of he peoplewho now have spine fellowships. He discussed his criticisms
of Dr. Oishi's failure to do a timely evaluation of his patient's infection symptoms
and explained his theory that the contralateral leg pain and relative graft fixation
at the second surgery indicated that the graft was probably not positioned
correctly at the first surgery.
The intraoperative X-ray was reviewed by Dr. Oishi, Dr. Barrash and the
committee members and there was no disagreement that the grafts appeared to
be properly placed on these films ..Dr. Barrash agreed that it would have been
better if he had looked at these films before testifying but thatthe attorney had
not provided any X-rays for him to examine.
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CONCLUSIONS OF THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT COMMITTEE
Infection:
The ·pce had no criticism 'of Dr. Barrash's testimony that Dr. Oishi fell
below the neurosurgical standard of care in failing to provide a timely diagnosis
and treatment of the patient's postoperative wound infection.
Charges of Inexperience:
. Dr. Oishi charged that Dr. Barrashlacks the experience to be testifying
about Dr. Oishi's spinal surgery since Dr. Barrash was not fellowship trained in
spinal surgery and has not been the primary surgeon on any splnat surqeries
since 1999. The MNS has no rule requiring a neurosurgical witness to be
actively participating as a primary surgeon nor that a spine fellowsh~p is required,
and evaluates testimony only on the basis of the testimony itself. Dr. Oishi's
charges on these counts were dismissed.
Dr. Barrash testified in his deposition that the two level lumbar fusion by
PLiF and lumbar pedicle "instrumentation 'should have taken only two hours' and
that the four hours taken by Dr. Oishi was a result of his 'lnexperience. The pec
did not consider four hours to complete the two level PLIF along with posterior
pedicle instrumentation to be particularly exceptional and certainly not indicative
of inexperience of the operating surgeon. Whether this statement by Dr. Barrash
was intentional misrepresentation through improper advocacy or lack of sufficient
subject matter knowledge is unclear but either way it was prejudicial and
unprofessional. AlthouqhDr, Barrash made no mention of his confusion at-either
the pee hearing, or later before the AANS Board of Directors, he now states that
he had failed to realize during his deposltlonthat Dr. Oishi had performed a two
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level decompression and a two level instrumented fusion. We think that his
recently expressed apology to Dr. Oishi for this testimony is appropriate.
Failure to Review:
Dr. Barrash never personally reviewed the imaging studies relevant to this
litigation, yet he testified that an interspace bone graft was probably improperly
placed during the first surgery. Dr. Barrash based this assertion upon the relative
fixation of the graft noted at the second surgery on March 7, 2004, the presence
of posterior instrumentation and the left leg pain following the -first surgery and
relieved after the second surgery. The intraoperative x-rays of February 2, 2004
were revieWed by the pee members during the hearing on October 25,2009 and
the graft appeared to the p~e members to be in-proper position at both the L4-5
a~d LS-S1 interspaces and with the posterior instrumentation also properly
placed. Dr. Barrash defended hiS failure to revlew these and other x-rays saying
that they were not obtained for him by the plaintiffs attorney. Reluctance of the
other side to provide relevant medical records or films is not an acceptable
excuse. Active discovery 'was underway. in this case and subpoenas or court
orders to produce documents or films are almost always available. Dr. Barrash
could and should have declined to testify about the graft placement at surgery
until he had been provided the relevant imaging studies. Dr. Barrash's failure to
insist on seeing the films· before testifying on this issue or rendering a written
opinion 'was contrary to Rule B2 of the AANS Rules for Neurosurgical Medical/Legal
Expert Opinion Services and was unprofessional in addition to having been, in the
opinion of the pee members and later the AANS Board of Directors, incorrect
about the graft position at the time of surgery.
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Chronic Pain Syndrome:
Dr. Barrash in his letter to attorney Michael Miller of August 10,' 2006
wrote that
"[The patient] now has a chronic pain problem, not from the surgery,
not from the injury, but from the lack of following the standard for rapid
treatment of a suspected and then confirmed infection. Were it not for
the negligence on the part of Dr. Oishi in not recognizing' and
addressing the infection that was smoldering in [the patient], his
condition today would not be one of chronic pain, disability, and the
attendant depression and hopelessness."
Chronic pain syndromes can follow injuries without surgery; and surgery
with or without complications. For Dr. Barrash to say that the failure to properly
identify and treat the infection caused' a chronic pain syndrome can only be
speculation, and to assert it' as the proximate cause of ongoing pain damages is
improper advocacy.
The pee concluded that; notwithstanding Dr. Barrash's appropriate
criticism of Dr. Oishi's delayed diagnosis and treatment of the patient's
postoperative wound infection, Dr. Barrash did fail to review all of the relevant
and available records before testifying, and failed at times to provide unbiased
testimony. The unprofessional testlrnonydescrioed above was significant, was
not de minimis, and in the oplnlonof the pee, warranted a six-month suspension
of membership.
The Board of Directors; rec~gnizing, the impropriety of that testimony, but
also acknowledging the correctness of some of Dr. Barrash's crltlcisms, reduced
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that sanction to a censure. A censure, while considered a disciplinary action, is
not reportable to the National Practitioners Databank.
We feel compelled to "respond to another issue which Dr. Barrash has
raised in his appeal. Dr. Barrash asserts that there was blas against him by a
particular member of the PCC. Dr. Barrash raised no objections to this individual
participating in the PCC hearing and when Dr. Barrash raised this issue for the
first time before the, Board, he presented no actual evidence that the PCC,
member in question was biased against him. 'Nevertheless, he now cites an
article by that PCC member in supposed SUPPQrt of his position. .
Finally, to clarify a point of:AANS history raised by Dr. Barrash, the PCC
was established to deal with complaints brought by one or more AANS members
against one or more other members. Often these .comptalnts have originated
from medical malpractice lawsuit testimony, as were the complaints in this
instance: The AANS has consistently encouraged appropriate testimony,
whether for the plaintiff or the defendant.
Th~ Board asks that you support its decision that Dr. Barrash be
Censured for unprofessional conduct while appearing as an expert witness in a
legal proceeding.
James Rutka, M.D.
AANS President
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Committee on Expert Witness Testimony Review  
Findings Regarding Expert Witness Testimony 
by Ronald L. Katz, M.D.  
In March 2011, the Judicial Council affirmed the findings of the Committee on Expert Witness 
Testimony Review and recommendation that ASA member Ronald L. Katz, M.D. be censured 
for failure to abide by ASA Guidelines for Expert Witness Qualifications and Testimony 
(“Guidelines”).  In accordance with the ASA Bylaws and Administrative Procedures, a 
resolution for censure was referred to the ASA Board of Directors and considered by the Special 
Board Committee on Expert Witness Testimony Review.  In November 2011, the Board 
censured ASA member Ronald L. Katz, M.D.   
Pursuant to ASA Administrative Procedure 11.8.7, the Committee Findings affirmed by the 
Judicial Council are posted below. 
FINDINGS 
A. Background
1. ASA member David B. Zucker, M.D. brought a Complaint against Ronald L.
Katz, M.D. alleging that Dr. Katz failed to abide by the ASA Guidelines with respect to expert 
witness testimony given in Patient v. Toledo Hospital, [Case No.] (Court of Common Pleas, 
County of Lucas, Ohio) (the “Case”).   
2. Dr. Katz offered expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiff in the Case, including
trial testimony on October 22, 2003.
1
  Dr. Zucker was a defendant in the Case.  The jury in the
Case returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.  The verdict was appealed, and while the appeal 
was pending, the case was settled and the appeal then dismissed.  Dr. Katz and Dr. Zucker are 
members of the ASA and are bound by the ethical requirements set forth in the ASA Guidelines. 
3. We find that the matter is properly within our jurisdiction as prescribed by ASA
Bylaws and Administrative Procedures.  Dr. Unruh, Chairman of the Committee, asked Dr. 
1
 Dr. Katz also provided deposition testimony in the Case; however, the deposition occurred prior to the effective 
date of the ASA Expert Witness Testimony Review Program and therefore is not subject to review. 
TAB B
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Patrick Birmingham, Dr. Robert B. Fisher, and Dr. Terry Walman (the “Committee 
Investigators”) to evaluate the allegations in the Complaint concerning Dr. Katz’s testimony and 
to make a recommendation to the Committee on whether Dr. Katz’s testimony raised a 
substantial question concerning compliance with the ASA Guidelines.  After reviewing the 
Complaint and supporting material and Dr. Katz’s written Response and supporting material, the 
Committee Investigators determined that certain allegations in the Complaint raised a substantial 
question concerning compliance with the ASA Guidelines and recommended that the Committee 
hold a hearing on those allegations.  The Committee agreed with the Committee Investigators’ 
recommendation, and the Committee held an oral hearing on September 29, 2010 (the 
“September 29 Hearing”), at which it heard testimony and argument on behalf of the Committee 
Investigators and Dr. Katz.  
4. The patient in the Case was a 55-year old female who presented in the emergency
room with abdominal pain.  [Medical Records at 39.]  She had a medical history of colitis, 
hypertension, coronary artery disease, hyperlipidemia, GERD, and diabetes mellitus type II.  
[Medical Records at 41.]  She had not had a bowel movement for 24 hours and had no flatus.  
[Medical Records at 39.]  According to the emergency center report, “[s]he has had some 
vomiting earlier” but “[s]he has had no vomiting lately.”  [Medical Records at 39.]  The 
provisional diagnosis on the emergency center report was “partial small bowel obstruction.”  
[Medical Records at 40.]  She was admitted to the hospital on that date.  According to the history 
and physical report, the patient was made NPO and medications (Cardizem, Tenormin, Lipitor, 
Prevacid, Glucophage, Neurontin) were to be continued “with sips only.”  [Medical Records at 
42-44.]
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5. On the next day, the patient vomited once but had no stools or flatus.  [Medical
Records at 47.]  The patient underwent a CT scan, which suggested some small bowel dilation.  
[Medical Records at 54.]   According to the operative report by the surgeon, “[w]hen the pain 
worsened, and the bowel sounds started to come in rushes, I felt that it was likely that [the 
patient] had a small bowel obstruction that needed operative release.”  [Medical Records at 54.]   
6. The ER team, the primary care team, and the consulting surgeon elected not to
place a nasogastric tube.  The patient arrived at the operating room at approximately 6:00 p.m. 
where Dr. Zucker evaluated her.  Dr. Zucker states in his Complaint:  “I reviewed her medical 
records and personally examined the patient.  During my evaluation of the patient, she reported 
no difficulty with previous anesthetics, and based on her physical examination, I anticipated no 
difficulty with intubation.”  [Complaint at 2.]        
7. Dr. Zucker did not place a nasogastric tube.  He elected to perform a rapid
sequence induction with cricoid pressure.  CRNA William Boardman, with over 14 years of 
experience, intubated the esophagus, which was immediately recognized.  CRNA Rose Demain, 
who had over 20 years of experience, then tried and again intubated the esophagus, which was 
immediately recognized.  Dr. Zucker then tried to intubate using a light wand but again intubated 
the esophagus, which was immediately recognized.  The patient was eventually intubated via a 
LMA in conjunction with a fiberoptic bronchoscope by another anesthesiologist, Kevin Lodge, 
M.D.
8. The hearing focused on two areas of testimony by Dr. Katz:  (1) Dr. Katz’s
testimony that Dr. Zucker breached the standard of care by allowing the patient’s esophagus to 
be intubated; and (2) Dr. Katz’s testimony that Dr. Zucker violated the standard of care by failing 
to ensure that a nasogastric tube was placed prior to induction of anesthesia. 
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B. Testimony Concerning Intubating the Esophagus.
9. Dr. Katz testified that Dr. Zucker deviated from the standard of care by allowing
the patient’s esophagus to be intubated.  In considering this area of testimony, we reviewed all of 
Dr. Katz’s trial and deposition testimony and considered the context in which the testimony was 
given.  In the following excerpt from his trial testimony, Dr. Katz sets forth his opinion on 
intubating the esophagus and provides the bases for his opinion -- all in response to questions 
posed by the plaintiff’s counsel: 
12 Q. Is it a deviation of accepted standard of 
13 care to put an endotracheal tube down an esophagus? 
14 A. It depends upon the circumstances. Doing 
15 esophageal intubation, per se, is not below the 
16 standard of care. I have, in attempting to do an 
17 endotracheal intubation, have attempted to do an 
18 esophagus, recognized it, pulled it out, and put it in 
19 the trachea. That can happen to anyone. 
20 But in this case, given the circumstances 
21 of a patient with a full stomach, to put the tube in 
22 the esophagus is to fail to properly do a rapid 
23 sequence induction and is below the standard of care. 
24 Q. What is the primary cause of an 
1 esophageal intubation, as opposed to getting the tube 
2 in the trachea? 
3 A. Well, It just means you didn't put it in 
4 the right place. It can be because the patient has 
5 unusual anatomy, which makes it difficult. 
6 And the example I gave a minute ago where 
7 I put the tube in the esophagus, that was in a patient 
8 who had cancer surgery and their face was not normal. 
9 So abnormal anatomy can be one cause. 
10 A second cause can be inexperience of the 
11 person doing it or the inability of the person to have 
12 good intubation skills. 
13 Q. Did you find any evidence in the records 
14 or the depositions that Patient] had any 
15 anatomical abnormalities? 
16 A. I asked you to send me pictures of her 
17 face in certain positions so I could get an idea of 
18 whether she had abnormal or unusual anatomy. Looking 
19 at those pictures, I didn't see that she had any 
5 
20 unusual anatomy. 
21 If the anesthesia care team felt she had 
22 unusual anatomy, I would have expected them to have 
23 written a note in the chart about it, and I didn't 
24 find such a note. 
1 And, finally, this patient had several 
2 other operations. Some before this case, before this 
3 operation we were discussing, and I believe one 
4 afterwards. In those four operations, there was no 
5 evidence of any difficulty. 
6 The reason I say that is that if a 
7 patient has a difficult airway, the anesthesiologist 
8 is supposed to tell the patient you are difficult. 
9 And, in fact, when I encounter a patient with a 
10 difficult airway that I can intubate, I advise them to 
11 buy a med-alert bracelet, and the bracelet says I am a 
12 difficult intubation. 
13 I also give them a letter describing what 
14 the problem is to give to the next anesthesiologist. 
15 As far as I know, no one ever told the patient she was 
16 a difficult intubation or that she had usual anatomy. 
17 And In looking at the picture, it didn't look like she 
18 had unusual anatomy to me. 
19 Q. Doctor, do you have those photographs 
20 handy? 
21 A. Yes, I do. 
22 Q. I've marked one of them. I have the 
23 duplicate. I've marked it as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3, 
24 and it's the frontal picture of [Patient] 
1 with her mouth open. Do you have that picture? 
2 A. Yes, I can see that. That's this one 
3 (indicating). 
4 Q. What does that show you? Describe for us 
5 what that's demonstrating. 
6 A.  It shows me a lot of things. It shows me 
7 how widely she can open her mouth, which is good. She 
8 has good mouth opening. And I can see a lot of the 
9 anatomy of the patient, including the uvula back here 
10 (indicating). 
11 So looking in the patients mouth, that 
12 tells me she can open it nicely and I can see pretty 
13 far down. So that tells me she should be a 
14 straightforward, pretty easy intubation. 
15 Q. Doctor, if a patient has no other 
16 abnormalities or problems present, do you have an 
17 opinion to a reasonable degree of medical probability 
6 
18 whether it was a deviation of accepted standard of 
19 care to place the endotracheal tube down the 
20 esophagus? 
21 A. Given the circumstances of this case, the 
22 answer is yes. 
[Trial Testimony of Ronald L. Katz dated October dated October 22, 2003 (“Katz Trial 
Testimony”) at 44:12 - 47:22.] 
10. In the Patient Case, Dr. Katz concluded that intubating the esophagus must have
been caused by Dr. Zucker’s negligence because the patient did not appear from photographs to 
have an unusual anatomy and because the patient did not have intubation problems in her other 
surgeries. We find that this testimony from Dr. Katz violates ASA Guidelines B1, B2, and B3.   
11. Guideline B1 provides:  “The physician’s review of the medical facts should be
truthful, thorough and impartial and should not exclude any relevant information to create a view 
favoring either the plaintiff or the defendant.”  Dr. Katz’s testimony on intubating the esophagus 
was neither thorough nor impartial.   
12. First, as Dr. Katz recognized elsewhere in his trial testimony and in a presentation
he gave at a conference for the Society of Ambulatory Anesthesia in 1998, many patients who 
appear to have normal airways turn out to be difficult or impossible to intubate.  At trial, in 
response to a question from Dr. Zucker’s counsel, Dr. Katz testified as follows: 
13 Q. Now, Doctor, a patient can appear to have 
14 a normal airway, but it turns out it's a difficult 
15 intubation regardless of that appearance; isn’t that 
16 correct? 
17 A. Yes. I said that in my deposition, I 
18 believe. 
[Katz Trial Testimony at 64:13-18.]  And, in his 1998 presentation, he said:  “While in some of 
the cases it should have been suspected there might be airway problems, this was not true in 
many cases.  Patients who appeared to have normal airways were found to be difficult or 
7 
impossible to intubate.”  Dr. Katz also confirmed during the September 29 Hearing that 
“notwithstanding appearances, sometimes a patient has an unrecognized difficult airway.”  
[Transcript from September 29 Hearing (“9/29/10 Hrg. Tr.”), Vol. II at 12:16-19.]  In light of 
these acknowledgments by Dr. Katz, we find that a thorough and impartial review of the medical 
facts would not support Dr. Katz’s reliance on photographs to conclude that the patient should 
have been a “straightforward, pretty easy intubation.”  [Katz Trial Testimony at 47:14.]      
13. We also do not find Dr. Katz’s reliance on the patient’s supposed easy intubation
in other surgeries to be thorough or impartial.  First, we note that Dr. Katz apparently assumed 
that the patient did not have intubation problems with her other surgeries.  He did not review the 
medical records from those other surgeries or speak to the anesthesiologists involved in the other 
surgeries.  [9/29/10 Hrg. Tr., Vol. II at 15:2-10.]
2
  More importantly, we are not persuaded that
the absence of intubation problems in the patient’s other surgeries establishes that negligence 
caused the patient’s intubation problems in the surgery at issue.   
14. Practice Guidelines for Management of the Difficult Airway (A Report by the
American Society of Anesthesiologists Task Force on Management of the Difficult Airway) 
provides:   “The difficult airway represents a complex interaction between patient factors, the 
clinical setting, and the skills and preferences of the practitioner.”  Practice Guidelines, 
Anesthesiology, V. 78, No. 3 (May 1993) at 597 (Record at 96).  In the surgery at issue, the 
clinical setting was an emergency surgery to release a small bowel obstruction.  The patient’s 
2
 Although we did not focus on any testimony from Dr. Katz’s deposition with respect to potential violations of the 
ASA Guidelines, Dr. Katz’s counsel urged us to consider Dr. Katz’s deposition testimony to understand the context 
of Dr. Katz’s opinions.  With respect to the patient’s other surgeries, Dr. Katz testified:  “And actually, the eight 
pictures that I have indicate to me that I would not expect her to be a difficult intubation and that fits with the four 
other operations, three of which I’m sure were under general anesthesia, one of which I don’t know whether it was 
general or regional.  That’s the hysterectomy.  It could have been done under general or regional.  So at least several 
of the operations were done under general anesthesia.  I’m assuming she was intubated and they didn’t have a 
problem.  And looking at the pictures, it looks to me like she’d be an easy intubation.”  [Deposition of Ronald Lewis 
Katz dated November 20, 2002 (“Katz Dep.”) at 13:3-13.] 
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other surgeries include:  partial hysterectomy; oophorectomy; open cholecystectomy; and 
appendectomy.  Dr. Katz’s testimony concerning the importance of the patient’s other surgeries 
does not take into account that the clinical settings of those surgeries were different than the 
clinical setting of the surgery at issue.  In fact, Dr. Katz could not even testify that all of the other 
surgeries were under general anesthesia.  [Katz Dep. at 13.]   
15. In short, given that patients who appear to have normal airways may turn out to be
difficult or impossible to intubate even when an anesthesiologist satisfies the standard of care -- a 
fact recognized by Dr. Katz -- we find that Dr. Katz’s reliance on the patient’s photographs and 
prior surgeries to conclude that Dr. Zucker acted negligently in allowing the patient’s esophagus 
to be intubated represents neither a thorough nor impartial review of the medical facts.  
Accordingly, we find that Dr. Katz violated Guideline B1.   
16. We also find that Dr. Katz’s testimony on intubating the esophagus violates
Guideline B2, which provides:  “The physician’s testimony should reflect an evaluation of 
performance in light of generally accepted standards, reflected in relevant literature, neither 
condemning performance that clearly falls within generally accepted practice standards nor 
endorsing or condoning performance that clearly falls outside accepted medical practice.”  Dr. 
Katz acknowledged on Page 44 of his trial testimony that intubating the esophagus “can happen 
to anyone” and is not a per se violation of the standard of care.  And, as discussed in Paragraph 
12 above, he also acknowledged that despite appearances, a patient may turn out to have an 
unrecognized difficult airway.  In other words, Dr. Katz acknowledged that allowing a patient’s 
esophagus to be intubated does not per se fall outside of generally accepted practice standards.  
Yet, he then condemns Dr. Zucker’s performance as falling outside of generally accepted 
practice standards on the basis that Dr. Zucker allowed the patient’s esophagus to be intubated.  
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Based on the record before us, Dr. Zucker’s performance clearly falls within generally accepted 
practice standards.  Dr. Katz’s testimony to the contrary violates ASA Guideline B2.  
17. We reviewed the literature submitted by Dr. Katz and find that it does not support
his testimony that because the patient appeared from photographs to be an easy intubation and 
because the patient did not have intubation problems in her other surgeries, her intubation 
problems in surgery at issue were the result of negligence by Dr. Zucker.  For example, Practice 
Guidelines for Management of a Difficult Airway (An Updated Report by the American Society 
of Anesthesiologists Task Force on Management of the Difficult Airway) states:  “There is 
insufficient published evidence to evaluate the effect of a bedside medical history on predicting 
the presence of a difficult airway.  Similarly, there is insufficient evidence to evaluate the effect 
of reviewing prior medical records on predicting the presence of a difficult airway.”  Practice 
Guidelines, Anesthesiology, V. 98, No. 5 (May 2003) at 1271 (Record at 104).     
18. Finally, we find that Dr. Katz violated Guideline B3, which provides:  “The
physician should make a clear distinction between medical malpractice and adverse outcomes 
not necessarily related to negligent practice.”  Here, Dr. Katz did not make such a distinction.  
Because the esophagus was intubated (an adverse outcome), Dr. Katz concluded that there must 
have been negligent practice.  But as Dr. Katz acknowledged, intubating the esophagus can 
happen to anyone and is not necessarily the result of any negligence.  Here, Dr. Katz fails to 
provide an adequate explanation for why in this case intubating the esophagus was the result of 
some type of negligent practice.  Therefore, we find his testimony violates Guideline B3.  
C. Testimony Concerning Placement of a Nasogastric Tube.
19. The September 29 Hearing also focused on Dr. Katz’s testimony concerning the
placement of a nasogastric tube.  Again, in considering this area of testimony, we reviewed all of 
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Dr. Katz’s trial and deposition testimony and considered the context in which the testimony was 
given.  In response to questions from plaintiff’s counsel, Dr. Katz testified as follows concerning 
the placement of a nasogastric tube: 
14 Q. Prior to her surgery on [Date], 
15 1999, had any physician placed a nasogastric tube in 
16 [Patien]t to decompress her stomach? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. In your opinion. was that a deviation of 
19 accepted standard of care? 
20 A. Absolutely. That's Anesthesia 1·A 
21 That's Medicine 1·A. 
22 Q. Do you hold that opinion to a reasonable 
23 degree of medical probability? 
24 A. Yes. 
1 Q. Doctor, earlier, you mentioned the 
2 anesthesiologist working I think you said as a 
3 teammate of the surgeon. 
4 Who should have placed the nasogastric 
5 tube in [Patient] to decompress her stomach 
6 during her surgery at approximately 6:15 on [Date]? 
8 A. Well, the usual practice is for the 
9 surgeon to place it, so I believe the surgeon should 
10 have put it in in this case initially. 
11 Q. And you've already told us no one did, so 
12 if the surgeon fails to do it, does anyone else have 
13 the responsibility to place a nasogastric tube? 
14 A. If the surgeon fails to do it, it then 
15 becomes the responsibility of the anesthesiologist to 
16 pass it. The example that I've used in teaching 
17 medical students is that the surgeon is the linebacker 
18 in this case, but if the player gets past the 
19 linebacker, then the anesthesiologist is the safety 
20 man, because he has the last chance to prevent the 
21 touchdown or prevent damage from occurring to the 
22 patient. 
23 So it's the primary responsibility of the 
24 surgeon. If the surgeon fails, then It's up to the 
1 anesthesiologist to do it. 
[Katz Trial Testimony at 33:14 - 35:1.] 
20. At the September 29 Hearing, Dr. Katz affirmed his testimony:
15 Q.  Dr. Katz, as I understood your testimony in the 
11 
16 Patient trial and today, it is your opinion that the 
17 standard of care requires the placement of a nasogastric 
18 tube in all patients with a presumed full stomach; is that 
19 right? 
20 A.  Yes. 
21 Q.  So, it’s your testimony that it is not a judgment  
22  call by an anesthesiologist? 
1 A.  That’s correct. 
[9/29/10 Hrg. Tr. Vol. II at 10:15-11:01.] 
21. We find that Dr. Katz’s testimony on the placement of a nasogastric tube violates
Guideline B2 because he condemns performance that clearly falls within generally accepted 
practice standards.  Dr. Katz testified that the standard of care mandated the placement of a 
nasogastric tube because the patient had a full stomach.  He told the jury that placing a 
nasogastric tube in a patient with a full stomach was elementary; it was “Anesthesia 1-A.”  We 
do not agree.  Placing a nasogastric tube in a patient with a full stomach is a judgment call, and 
we find that anesthesiologists could reasonably differ on whether to place a nasogastric tube 
under the circumstances of this Case.   
22. Because anesthesiologists could reasonably differ on whether to place a
nasogastric tube under the circumstances of this Case, Dr. Katz improperly condemned Dr. 
Zucker’s decision not to place a nasogastric tube.  Dr. Zucker’s decision not to place a 
nasogastric tube under the circumstances of the case and to perform a rapid sequence induction 
with application of cricoid pressure clearly falls within generally accepted practice standards.   
Dr. Katz’s testimony to the contrary violates Guideline B2.   
23. Moreover, Dr. Katz did not limit his testimony to the circumstances of this Case.
Rather, he broadly and absolutely stated that placing a nasogastric tube in a patient with a 
presumed full stomach is the standard of care.  During the September 29 Hearing, the Committee 
questioned Dr. Katz regarding the broad and absolute nature of his opinion, and Dr. Katz 
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responded:  “Well, you know, I feel very strongly that -- you know, and the term -- I think it’s 
Barash uses the term incumbent.  And, to me, that means you have to do it, and I agree with that.  
Unless there’s a contraindication to pass a nasogastric tube, it needs to be done in a patient with 
full stomach.”  [9/29/10 Hrg. Tr., Vol. II at 20:4-9.]  We do not dispute that Dr. Katz strongly 
believes that a nasogastric tube should be placed in any patient with a presumed full stomach 
(unless there is a contraindication), but we find that this is a personal belief of Dr. Katz’s that 
does not accurately reflect the standard of care.      
24. Dr. Katz provided literature that identified placement of a nasogastric tube as one
method that may be used to reduce the risk of regurgitation and aspiration.  Dr. Katz argues that 
because the literature recommends the method that he testified was mandated, his testimony is 
supported by the literature.  However, the fact that the literature recommends that an 
anesthesiologist consider a specific procedure to reduce the risk of aspiration does not mean that 
the recommended procedure is the only acceptable and appropriate method to be utilized or that 
other alternative methods cannot be employed.  
25. The Committee Investigators proved the foregoing violations of the Guidelines by
clear and convincing evidence.  The Complaint also contended that Dr. Katz’s testimony violated 
the Guidelines in several other respects; however, the Committee Investigators did not pursue 
those allegations at the hearing. 
D. Other Challenges Raised by Dr. Katz at the September 29 Hearing.
26. Dr. Katz’s counsel argued at the September 29 Hearing that the testimony
identified by the Committee Investigators as violating the ASA Guidelines was excerpted and 
taken out of context.  We reject this argument for several reasons.  First, we note that we have 
reviewed and considered all of the material provided by both Dr. Zucker and Dr. Katz in this 
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proceeding, including the entirety of Dr. Katz’s trial and deposition testimony.  Therefore, we 
have considered the testimony identified by the Committee Investigators in the context it was 
given by Dr. Katz.  Dr. Katz’s counsel urged that we consider Dr. Katz’s deposition testimony 
because it provided context for Dr. Katz’s opinions.  We have considered Dr. Katz’s deposition 
testimony and find it to be consistent with Dr. Katz’s trial testimony.  We specifically considered 
the passages that Dr. Katz’s counsel identified on pages 45 and 50 of the deposition testimony, 
where Dr. Katz testified that the deviations from the standard of care that he identified (including 
failing to place a nasogastric tube and intubating the esophagus) together caused the aspiration.  
This is consistent with Dr. Katz’s trial testimony (at page 50) on causation.  However, contrary 
to the statements of Dr. Katz’s counsel at the September 29 Hearing (at page 105-106), Dr. Katz 
did not testify in his deposition or at trial that the combination of intubating the esophagus, 
failing to place the nasogastric tube, and failing to reduce the acidity of the gastric contents in the 
stomach deviated from the standard of care.  Rather, he testified that each of these three things 
separately and independently deviated from the standard of care and that the combination of 
them caused the aspiration.  The focus of the September 29 Hearing was not on Dr. Katz’s 
causation opinion but on whether it was a deviation from the standard of care to intubate the 
esophagus and whether it was a deviation of the standard of care to fail to place a nasogastric 
tube.  The passages identified from Dr. Katz’s deposition do not address these issues.     
27. During the September 29 Hearing, Dr. Katz’s counsel also argued that the entire
record from the Case must be considered to reach a decision in this proceeding.  We have not 
identified any additional material from the Case that we believe we need to review in order to 
reach a decision in this matter but that was not provided to us by either Dr. Katz or Dr. Zucker.  
To the extent that Dr. Katz believes that there is testimony that we did not have in our possession 
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that we should have reviewed, he had an opportunity in these proceedings to submit any material 
he wished for us to review.         
28. Dr. Katz’s counsel also argued in the September 29 Hearing that Dr. Katz’s
testimony was constrained by the questions he was asked by defense counsel.  Again, we reject 
this argument.  First, we do not find that Dr. Katz’s testimony on intubating the esophagus or 
placing the nasogastric tube was constrained by any of the questions posed to him.  Rather, his 
trial testimony and the opinions he provided on these two issues were fully consistent with his 
testimony at the September 29 Hearing.  In fact, the key testimony we cite in Paragraphs 9 and 
19 above is testimony that Dr. Katz provided on the standard of care and was testimony that Dr. 
Katz provided in support of the plaintiff and in response to questions from plaintiff’s -- not 
defense -- counsel.  As Dr. Katz acknowledged at the September 29 Hearing, his standard of care 
opinions were fully and completely provided to the jury.  [9/29/10 Hrg. Tr. Vol. II at 16-17.]  In 
general, we reject the implication made by such an argument that an expert witness cannot be 
expected to comply with the ASA Guidelines when being questioned by opposing counsel.  The 
ASA Guidelines apply regardless of which counsel is asking the questions.  An expert witness 
can respond to the questions asked and still comply with the ASA Guidelines.   
29. In stating his or her opinion as to what is accepted medical practice, the expert
witness must provide a fair, objective and unbiased presentation of the facts and accepted 
treatment options.  In fact, ethical guidelines -- such as Guideline B1 -- obligate medical experts 
to acknowledge plausible alternative treatment options or modes of practice, even if the expert 
witness would not herself or himself employ such treatment options or modes of practice.  Under 
Guideline B1, it is improper to define the standard of care so narrowly to only encompass the 
mode of practice preferred by the expert witness when other acceptable treatment options exist.  
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Otherwise, the expert’s testimony could not be presented “unchanged for use by either the 
plaintiff or defendant” as required by Guideline B1.      
